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Universities without Academic 
Freedom Have No Place in 
Rankings
Carsten A. Holz
The newly released 2021 Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings carry few surprises. The usual contestants lead the rankings. Yet among these are 
some institutions, operating under totalitarian regimes, that do not match our expec-
tation of what universities are about. If one adjusts the top 150 universities in the THE 
World University Rankings for academic freedom, those from the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC, including Hong Kong) and from Singapore drop to the bottom of the list.
The Core Values of or Universities
Current university rankings gloss over that which we value most: free academic discourse. 
In some countries, academic freedom is nonexistent. Take, for example, the PRC. Fudan 
University in Shanghai ranks highly in world university rankings. In late 2019, its charter 
was revised to remove “freedom of thought,” and the word “independently” was dropped 
from sentences describing the management of the university and the conduct of aca-
demic studies. Inserted was “the comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party.” 
Student spies reporting on their professors has become common practice across PRC 
campuses, as has the dismissal of politically inconvenient faculty members. Contrast 
this with our understanding of the role of freedom in academia, as expressed by Philip 
Altbach in 2001: “Academic freedom is at the very core of the mission of the university. 
It is essential to teaching and research. Many would argue that a fully developed higher 
education system cannot exist without academic freedom.” 
Or take Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, tenured professors are fired for political reasons. 
And criticism of the “central government,” if interpreted by agents of the regime as “un-
dermining the authority of the central government,” will nowadays lead to imprison-
ment. Contrast this with New Zealand law, which assigns to universities, among others, 
“the role of critic and conscience of society.” 
Adjusting University Rankings for Academic Freedom
It is high time to stop treating academic freedom—the very foundation of a university—
as an irrelevant ornament of academia. But adjusting the THE World University Rankings 
for academic freedom is difficult. 
The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden 
has now for the first time incorporated a total of five indicators of academic freedom in 
its database (for 1900 through 2019). These five indicators have allowed researchers to 
construct a rudimentary academic freedom index across countries.
Adjusting the THE World University Rankings for academic freedom (by multiplying 
the THE score with the academic freedom index value) reveals an astounding pattern. 
While most universities exhibit an almost one-to-one correspondence between their 
ranks in the unadjusted and the adjusted THE World University Rankings, a single set of 
universities stands out. Focusing on the top 150 universities in the original THE World 
University Rankings, the seven mainland Chinese universities plunge from ranks 20, 23, 
70, 87, 94, 100, and 111 to the very bottom of the list. All five Hong Kong universities and 
both Singapore universities, the highest of these originally ranked 25th and 39th, end 
up in 137th to 143rd place, just above the seven mainland Chinese institutions. 
Alternatively, consider press freedom as a proxy for academic freedom. In the Unit-
ed States, academic freedom derives from the First Amendment on free speech, and so 
Abstract
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due more than lip service, then 
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does freedom of the press. While not identical, academic freedom and freedom of the 
press go hand in hand. Reporters without Borders compiles a World Press Freedom In-
dex covering 180 nations.
The results are virtually the same. The mainland Chinese universities tumble to the 
very bottom of the list, immediately preceded by the Singapore and Hong Kong univer-
sities (with one of the latter universities, the University of Hong Kong, ranking slightly 
higher, in 132nd place). Additionally, adjusting by press freedom favors continental Eu-
ropean universities over UK and US universities, because press freedom is significant-
ly higher in countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany than in the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
Is press freedom a reliable proxy for academic freedom? The fact that a scientific study 
of academic freedom across 28 European countries ranks the UK 27th suggests that it is. 
And the PRC’s rank of 177 in press freedom, surpassing only Eritrea, Turkmenistan, and 
North Korea, matches what we know about academic freedom in the PRC.
Academic Freedom in the Age of STEM and Extreme Managerialism
In the author’s home institution, the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HK-
UST), faculty members in STEM (sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics) 
fields see little need for academic freedom. Predominantly mainland Chinese scholars 
in these fields chastise colleagues in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences for 
research that could, just possibly, attract unwelcome attention from the regime, to the 
point where colleagues leave. 
Many of these mainland faculty will be Chinese Communist Party members whose 
membership oath includes, among others, to “carry out the Party’s decisions, strictly 
observe Party discipline, guard Party secrets, and be loyal to the Party.” Party allegiance 
trumps everything, including academic freedom.
It does not help when the institution has taken managerialism to an extreme, from 
the absence of meaningful faculty participation in academic matters to a passive, man-
agement-controlled “senate” and the lack of a labor union. The PRC model of higher 
education means focusing on STEM under factory-like arrangements controlled by man-
agement/the Party. Under such a system, there is no room for freedom of thought about 
society, the economy, let alone the polity or history. The truth is owned by the Party.
In a speech titled “What Is a University?” given in 1935 in his capacity as president 
of the University of Chicago, Robert M. Hutchins stated that “a university cannot exist 
without freedom of enquiry, freedom of discussion, and freedom of teaching,” and that 
“the purpose of education is not to fill the minds of students with facts; it is not to re-
form them, or amuse them, or make them expert technicians in any field. It is to teach 
them to think, if that is possible, and to think always for themselves.” Under a totali-
tarian regime, there is no freedom of enquiry, no freedom of discussion, no freedom of 
teaching, and no learning to think for oneself.
Replacing “freedom of thought” with “comprehensive leadership of the Communist 
Party” and replacing the quest for truth with Party “truth” constitutes nothing less than 
a public declaration that this institution has abdicated its right to be considered a uni-
versity. Then why is it still included in university rankings? 
The Consequences of Ignoring Academic Freedom in University Rankings
It is for good reason that the motto of Harvard University is “veritas” (Latin for “verity” 
or “truth”) and that of Stanford University “Die Luft der Freiheit weht” (German for “the 
wind of freedom blows”). Academic freedom in the quest for truth is the very founda-
tion of a university. The comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party and its mo-
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University rankings such as the THE World University Rankings reward totalitarian re-
gimes for their transformation of academia into a strictly controlled system targeting re-
gime-desired technological advances, with the humanities and social sciences reduced 
to a soulless wasteland. Human values make way for obedience to the Great Leader. A 
body of castrated pseudo-academics shapes research fields worldwide as journal ed-
itors, reviewers, and article authors. And institutions built on strict obedience to the 
Communist Party in a world devoid of freedom of thought constitute great universities.
Education Agents and Their 
Work with Universities
Vincenzo Raimo, Iona Yuelu Huang, and Eddie West
There are estimated to be some 20,000 education or international student recruit-ment agencies worldwide. These enterprises have become a key conduit of the ever 
more commercialized journey that thousands of international students make each year 
to enroll in universities abroad. These middle wo/men, serving as intermediaries be-
tween universities, increasingly desperate for international tuition fee revenues, and 
students searching for their perfect international study destination, have become a 
staple of the international student recruitment industry.
What Are Education Agents? 
The UK Government Department for International Trade provides a description of an 
agent as a person or entity that “works on behalf of an exporter [in this case, univer-
sities], introducing their products or services [degree courses] to potential clients [i.e., 
students]...” And it tells us that “The agent is paid a percentage of the selling price” (the 
tuition fee).
 There are also agencies that are contracted by the students to support them in their 
applications to overseas universities. This type of agent is not considered in this article 
except insofar as they are also contracted by the university, i.e., contracted and paid by 
both the student and the university—what Americans refer to as “double dipping.” 
Why Do Universities Work with Agents? 
Universities work with agents because they consider them a cost-effective way of secur-
ing new international student enrollments. In Huang et al.’s study, Power and control: 
Managing agents for international student recruitment in higher education, university 
staff reported a variety of reasons for working with agents, stating that “agents are a 
very quick way into getting students”; that “the cost of going there [emerging markets] 
is so high and the return on investment is not there”; because certain countries are un-
safe for university staff travel; and because competitors work with agents and univer-
sities do not want to miss out on opportunities.
While we lack detailed reliable data on the use of agents, except for Australia, we do 
know that nearly all universities in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and 
a growing number in the United States, work with agents, and that some universities 
rely very heavily on agents to meet student intake targets. Agents have also become a 
key channel for international student recruitment to universities in continental Europe 
as well as in private and public institutions worldwide where international tuition fee 
revenue is critical, including international branch campuses.
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How Many Students Are Recruited via Agents? 
Agents are involved in the recruitment of students at all levels, including PhD programs. 
While there are a variety of data sources for the percentage of students recruited through 
agents, we found no single reliable, up-to-date, comparative source. The most author-
itative source at a country level is that published by the Australian government, which 
reports that 73 percent of all international students recruited to Australian universities 
in 2018 came via an agent. The New Zealand government reports that 50 percent of inter-
national students are recruited through agents. There is no official national data on the 
use of agents for the United Kingdom, but our research suggests that at least a third of 
international students in the United Kingdom come through agents, with some universi-
ties relying almost entirely on agents for their international student intake. Data for the 
United States is the most elusive, in part because the sector is so diverse and because 
agents remain controversial in some quarters. However, the Observatory on Borderless 
Higher Education (OBHE) reported in 2014 that 11 percent of students in US universities 
were recruited through agents and, more recently, Bridge Education Group reported 
that 22 percent of international students in the United States are recruited via agents.
Commission rates reported by universities range from 12 to 15 percent of the first-year 
tuition fee, but competitive pressures lead some universities to pay significantly more. 
Increasingly, universities are also paying continuation commissions, in particular for 
students who progress from a pathway program to Year 1. In addition to flat rate com-
missions, some universities also pay bonuses for meeting volume or other targets, and 
also provide other incentives like expenses-paid campus “familiarization tours.” Some 
agents also receive payments from the students whom they advise, in addition to being 
compensated by the universities for which they recruit, an inherent conflict of interest 
when these dual sources of income are not transparent—which is most often the case.
How Is the University–Agent Relationship Governed?
Beyond Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, there is little direct government 
regulation over the way in which universities work with agents to recruit students. 
In the United Kingdom, the role of agents and the extent of their use by universities 
is a largely hidden activity. The Quality Assurance Agency’s guide to Supporting and En-
hancing the Experience of International Students in the UK advises universities to make 
up-to-date lists of appointed agents public and make clear to students that agents of-
fer a service for which they are paid by providers. There is little evidence of uniform 
compliance with either recommendation. While the United Kingdom’s consumer pro-
tection body for students, The Office for Students, has raised questions about the role 
of agents in its review of university admissions, it is yet to report on the matter or go 
as far as to issue any formal guidance or regulation. 
In the United States, incentive-compensation-based recruitment of domestic students 
is prohibited by the Higher Education Act, which governs the administration of federal 
financial aid. But a “carve out,” or exception, allows that this restriction does “not ap-
ply to the recruitment of foreign students residing in foreign countries who are not el-
igible to receive federal student assistance.” However, actual governmental oversight 
of international recruitment agent activity is, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. 
In our study, Governance of agents in the recruitment of international students: A ty-
pology of contractual management approaches in higher education, we examined the 
contractual governance approaches adopted by universities in Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, and how the outcome of these approaches was per-
ceived by university managers. 
Among our conclusions is that a one-size-fits-all approach to the contractual gov-
ernance of agents is ill-advised because of the many variables and risks inherent in 
international student recruitment activity. The laissez-faire archetype illustrates the 
need for active involvement in agent management by universities, notwithstanding the 
temptation to outsource the function entirely. And while working with fewer agents with 
strong relational contractual governance tends to lead to better results, if universities 
work with a large number of agents, it is important to specify, and follow through on, 
monitoring terms and processes in agents’ contracts. 
73 percent of all interna-
tional students recruited to 
Australian universities in 
2018 came via an agent.
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Conclusions
Education agents have been an important part of the international student recruitment 
marketing mix for many years. Increasing pressures on university finances, coupled more 
recently with COVID-19 travel restrictions, is intensifying reliance on agents, further en-
suring their role as a mainstay in sustaining universities’ financial wellbeing.
With ever more students being recruited to universities through agents, greater trans-
parency about their work for universities is, in our view, long overdue. Failing to pri-
oritize transparency risks students’ welfare and universities’ reputations. Host country 
regulations and codes of practice are only useful where they are rigorously followed by 
universities and clearly communicated to prospective international students, and where 
they can be policed.  
Undervaluing Doctoral 
Education post COVID
Tessa DeLaquil and Lizhou Wang
In July 2020, we wrote a personal reflection on the isolation of doctoral education in the times of COVID-19, focusing on the effects of lost opportunities for skills devel-
opment, training, and network-building in doctoral education. While we made some 
recommendations at that point for ways to counter a few of these issues, new systemic 
challenges have since emerged in different national and institutional contexts. 
As national systems of higher education and individual higher education institutions 
grapple with loss of funds in this pandemic year, recent months have shown that the 
consequences may have dire implications especially for doctoral education. In this ar-
ticle, we demonstrate that by undervaluing the role of doctoral education in higher ed-
ucation, national higher education systems risk critical long-term damage, not only to 
higher education, but also to economic and human development.
The Value of Doctoral Education
With the rise of the knowledge economy, individual nations have sought to differentiate 
and to strengthen their higher education systems through inclusion of research universi-
ties. This trend includes the creation of doctoral-level programs across disciplines, from 
STEM fields to the humanities and social sciences. As such, doctoral students play an in-
creasingly important role in the economic and sociopolitical development of countries 
through their roles in universities as participants in the creation of knowledge through 
research. Doctoral students are also involved as teachers or as teaching assistants in 
educating and training undergraduate students. In this way, doctoral students contrib-
ute directly and indirectly to the labor force across various industries.
With highly specialized knowledge in their respective fields, original research skills, 
and transferable competencies, doctoral graduates are expected to be important con-
tributors to the knowledge economy, both within academia and industry. A doctoral de-
gree has become a common prerequisite for academic research and teaching positions.
Centers vs. Peripheries?
The growing educational gap between centers and peripheries in international high-
er education, that is, between high-income, middle-income, and low-income regions, 
countries, national systems, institutions, and individuals, has been exacerbated during 
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the pandemic. In spite of the importance of graduate programs, many institutions and 
education departments in various countries have cut or plan to cut programs, especial-
ly in arts, humanities, and social sciences. This process does not only occur at institu-
tions in peripheral countries, but also at top-tier institutions within center countries. 
Doctoral programs, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, across the 
United States have suspended admissions for the Fall 2021, including at Harvard, Brown, 
Columbia, MIT, New York University, and more. The reasons given are related to limited 
resources, which departments are electing to redirect to support their current doctor-
al students. However, restricting admissions in this way may “squeeze the pipeline” for 
PhD students in the humanities and social sciences, with potentially more significant 
effects on the least advantaged of prospective students. 
In March 2020, UK PhD students and early career researchers sent a letter to UK Re-
search and Innovation (UKRI) requesting an extension of research funding for the length 
of the pandemic. However, in November 2020, UKRI “strongly advised” that students ad-
just their projects to fit their original funding periods, providing limited funds to those 
students struggling the most to complete their projects in time.
The UK and US cases above point to the restrictive effects of COVID-19 on doctoral 
education. For prospective PhD students, this limits access to doctoral education for at 
least one year, with possible knock-on effects as competition for limited places increas-
es in the coming years. With fewer peers in their programs, current PhD students in the 
United States and in other similar doctoral systems may also be spread thin across de-
partments to maintain the current level of departmental research and teaching func-
tions. In the United Kingdom, without funding extensions, PhD students may be forced 
to change the substance of their research in order to meet resource constraints, argu-
ably going against the very purpose of a doctoral degree. 
Germany has done the opposite, with a cabinet decision in April 2020 to extend con-
tracts for PhD students by a length of time equal to the amount of time lost due to COV-
ID-related restrictions. 
On the other hand, universities in Hong Kong and Singapore decided to provide fund-
ing and additional places for students whose study abroad plans were interrupted due 
to COVID-19. Prestigious individual universities, such as Hong Kong University and The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, offered lucrative scholarship schemes for outstand-
ing candidates who hold a PhD admission offer from top universities around the world. 
These plans have successfully attracted a considerable number of applications from 
students from various countries.
Brain Drain or Brain Gain?
The above examples demonstrate how global talent flows might change during and af-
ter the COVID-19 pandemic. Nations and institutions that highly value doctoral educa-
tion are taking advantage of the situation and expect to obtain long-term benefits of 
“brain gain,” as these students adjust to local lifestyles, learn the local language, receive 
training, conduct research, and build academic networks, regardless of whether they are 
domestic or international students. 
Nonetheless, providing global economic and social activities return to “normal” in a 
few years, will institutions at the center continue to attract top talent and PhD gradu-
ates in research, teaching, and postdoc positions, in spite of their decisions during the 
pandemic period? Although these institutions at the center, such as those in the US 
or UK cases, may undervalue PhD education in their current decisions and pause PhD 
recruitment for a year or two, the unequal power dynamic in global higher education 
might persist to their advantage. However, from the world wars to the recent geopo-
litical tensions, history has shown that international talents demonstrate their prefer-
ences through the way they flee and flow in times of trouble and in times of stability.
Conclusion
The training and support (financial and other) of doctoral students in COVID-19 times are 
critical for the future of research and the next generation of scholars across disciplines. 
Universities are making hard decisions regarding whether to cut funding—in particular in 
the humanities and social sciences. Although these cuts might seem financially beneficial 
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in the short term, such decisions have ramifications for research capacity building in the 
long run. Changes in national/institutional policies may alter global talent flows for a 
few years, but it is difficult to conclude who will benefit most and for how long. With the 
shifting world order, the clear effects of populist nationalism in some countries at the 
center, and with more openness and multilateralism in the policies of emerging econ-
omies, there is no guarantee that global talent flows will once again turn in their favor.
 
Measuring Higher Education 
Access: Purpose and Context
C. M. Malish
The share of the population getting access to higher education (HE) and joining the workforce with higher education qualifications is an important indicator of the 
quality of labor and of countries’ potential for social and economic development. Plan-
ners and policy makers rely on indicators to assess progress, set targets for future ex-
pansion of the HE sector, and focus on particular social groups to ensure equity across 
an expanding system. Gross enrollment ratio (GER) is a widely used indicator to meas-
ure access to HE. Recently, though, Pankaj Mittal and Bhushan Patwardhan (IHE, 2020, 
Fall Issue # 104) argued that another measure, called eligible enrollment ratio (EER), is 
a more realistic indicator for measuring access to HE, especially for economies such as 
India’s. This article attempts to contribute to the debate by comparing the merits and 
demerits of GER and EER. 
Indicators of Access to Higher Education
Enrollment ratio (ER) reflects the vital linkage between education and society at large. 
Gross enrollment ratio (GER), net intake rate (NIR), net enrollment rate (NER), and gross 
intake ratio (GIR) are some of the main indicators relied upon when making compari-
sons between educational systems. Not all indicators are suitable for HE. For instance, 
NER, which calculates the percentage of age-specific enrollment for a given level of ed-
ucation, is rarely used in HE, as total age-specific enrollment is difficult to calculate due 
to the multiplicity of available entry pathways.
Gross Enrollment Ratio
Among these indicators, GER is widely and globally used as an indicator to measure ac-
cess to HE. Even the classification of HE into elite, mass, and universal stages (by Mar-
tin Trow, in the early 1970s) is based on GER. According to the UNESCO Institute of Sta-
tistics, GER represents total enrollment at a specific level of education, regardless of 
age, expressed as a percentage of the total number of the age cohort corresponding to 
that same level of education. Since 18–23 is the age segment of the group enrolled in 
higher education in India, GER in a given year is calculated as total enrollment in higher 
education institutions (HEIs), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total 
18–23-year-old population cohort that year.
Tessa DeLaquil and Lizhou 
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Eligible Enrollment Ratio 
As indicated by Mittal and Patwardhan, EER is calculated as the total enrollment in HE 
in a given year regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total number of the 
age cohort (in the official HE age group) who have attained a secondary qualification 
(class 12). Thus, applying this additional eligibility criterion simply excludes all those in 
the age cohort who did not attain a secondary qualification. EER provides vital insights 
about demand and supply conditions in HE. However, unlike GER, EER can in principle 
be increased in two different ways. One is by increasing the total enrollment, and the 
second by reducing the number of members of the qualified age cohort. The second 
scenario is obviously not progressive. For instance, EER can be high even with a very 
low level of total enrollment, if the size of the eligible and qualified (12th class pass) age 
cohort is limited: If 1,000 out of one million college-going age population in a country 
have passed the secondary school certificate and the total enrollment in HE is 1,000, 
then EER is 100 percent.
Comparing GER and EER
“GER vs. EER” appears to be a false debate. As discussed, the purpose of each indicator 
is different. The comparative advantage that each brings in should not be the rationale 
for preferring one over another. We need to examine both the purpose for and the con-
text of using an indicator. In the specific context of the knowledge economy, the share 
of the population acquiring higher education qualifications is crucial information for 
social and economic planning. Here, GER serves an important purpose, indicating how 
many college-aged youths are enrolled in HEIs. A high GER means that more are enrolled 
in colleges and universities. On the contrary, EER, taken independently, is inadequate 
to provide direction for planners. For instance, a higher EER could be due to a lower 
number of eligible-age cohorts. So EER is meaningful only in comparison with GER. It 
is noteworthy that in mature HE systems such as, for instance, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany, the gap between GER and EER is minimal. It is due to the 
progress that these systems have made in universalizing school education. 
Mittal and Patwardhan drew our attention to some of the limitations of GER. For in-
stance, including international students when calculating GER is allegedly giving undue 
advantage to mature HE systems, which attract numerous students from all over the 
world. There are three more factors impacting GER in emerging economies like India. 
First, the enrollment of mature students (who are older than the official HE age group). 
In universalized HE systems such as the United States and the United Kingdom, mature 
students constitute a substantial share of the total enrollment and are an influential 
factor in calculating GER. This phenomenon is not significant in some other regions such 
as Asia and Africa. Second is the duration of undergraduate (UG) programs. Compared to 
four-year UG degrees such as in the United States, Indian UG degrees take three years, 
except for technical and professional programs such as engineering and medicine. This 
has serious implications on GER. Third is the inclusion of all types of postsecondary qual-
ifications when calculating GER. Some postsecondary study programs, which are below 
the bachelor degree (level 6 of ISCED 2011), should not be considered higher education.
Conclusion
To conclude, GER and EER indicate two distinctive scenarios of HE enrollment. Therefore, 
discussing the advantage of the one over the other may not be very helpful. Although 
EER is an important indicator, taken alone it is of little use for planners of education and 
economy. If the aim is to envision an inclusive society and a globally competitive econ-
omy in a knowledge era, then GER better suits this purpose. Therefore, it is more likely 
that GER will continue to remain the main indicator to measure access to HE. However, 
there is immense potential for improving it, to make it globally comparable and fairer 
for low and lower-middle economies. 
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Internationalization, 
Digitalization, and COVID: A 
German Perspective
Dorothea Rüland
D igitalization has been a pressing issue on the agenda for quite some time, and for good reason. Now, however, we are facing a turning point: COVID-19 is speeding 
up many processes; the cards are being reshuffled. We find ourselves in the middle of 
an extensive transformation process, which will change not only the academic world of 
universities, but also our working environment—and our lives in general. 
The Impact of COVID-19 on International Higher Education
Universities, international higher education, and international research collaboration 
will look quite different after COVID-19, for several reasons. Science has never been as 
important as today. We need tight-knitted networks to face major global themes such 
as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, since no country can overcome these chal-
lenges on its own. The fight against COVID-19 illustrates that fact.
International research collaboration has proven to be quite fruitful and resilient dur-
ing this crisis. More research has been published in an international context than during 
a similar time period before COVID-19, especially during the beginning of the crisis. For 
good reasons: Research partners knew each other very well, a common understanding 
and trust existed on all sides. Switching to a digital mode was easy. Therefore, scientific 
cooperation will be the key to successful internationalization in the future.
The Role of Digitalization in Higher Education
But what is the role of digitalization amid all these trends? Digitalization renders us 
much more independent from time and space. The largest accelerator in this process 
has been COVID-19. Mobility came to a stop in March 2020 and left no other option. From 
one day to the next, universities worldwide had to move to virtual classrooms. Univer-
sities all over the world had to find new ways of teaching and doing research. If we look 
back over the last few months altogether, this change worked quite well.
So, is everything all right and will the academic world soon become entirely digital? 
Most likely not—but what will the future look like? The role of physical and digital mo-
bility will definitely change. As mentioned before, the switch to digitalization in cooper-
ation worked quite well because researchers already knew each other, had met before, 
and were used to working together.
Students and the New Academic World
Meanwhile, circumstances look quite different for students. The younger generation de-
serves the chance to get to know each other personally, build intercultural skills, meet 
people in a foreign country, learn about different perspectives, develop trust and net-
works and all the benefits deriving from physical mobility. Therefore, on this level, phys-
ical mobility will still play a very important role. Nevertheless, digitalization can be a 
useful tool to prepare and accompany physical mobility. 
We do know that at least 50 percent of all students in Germany will never go abroad 
for several reasons, for example, funding or family. Here again, digitalization can sup-
port internationalization at home in many ways. A further advantage of digitalization is 
that it allows for a new diversity. Digitalization might serve as one of the main catalysts 
in reaching new target groups, offering equal opportunities, diversifying the student 
body, and allowing more outreach. 
Will the academic world soon 
become entirely digital?
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The quality of studies might improve because it is much easier and more convenient 
to bring the most renowned scientists together in a virtual space than to expect them to 
travel. But we should not forget that a lot depends on digital infrastructure. We should 
keep this in mind whenever we think about digital cooperation. There are still parts in 
the world where access cannot be taken for granted. And we should not increase the 
digital divide that already exists. Circling back to individuals, it is noticeable that the 
benefits of digital formats of mobility increase depending on how far an individual is 
in their studies.
An academic environment that is 100 percent digital is, however, unlikely to become a 
reality for the majority of students worldwide. We know from research done in this field 
that currently, digital study programs offer an alternative to only 10 percent of students 
interested in internationalization. We might look at a different picture if we focused on 
lifelong learning and not only on full study programs, but also on micro credentials.
Looking Beyond the Digitalization of Academic Mobility
Therefore, in the future, we have to ask ourselves what effects and outcomes we expect 
from mobility, to then be able to decide which kind of mobility—whether of a physical 
or virtual kind—offers the best approach to reach this goal.
This is just one dimension of digitalization and its role for internationalization. How-
ever, internationalization is so much more than just mobility. To continue this train of 
thought, we might not only have to rethink internationalization, but universities as a 
whole. European universities and their respective networks have had to switch to digi-
talization to uphold their multilateral cooperation. As mentioned before, digitalization 
renders us more independent and flexible. Why should each university offer the same 
courses? Would it not make sense to join forces and develop study programs together, 
the way it works within some area studies at German universities? 
A different dimension will be to digitalize the student journey and the field of ad-
ministration at universities. Students will be supported individually according to their 
needs and interests and be guided through their journey to the foreign country of their 
choice, to the university where they might decide to study. All this could be organized 
conveniently and efficiently via digitalization and artificial intelligence. This is not a 
brave new world, it is already a reality in Germany in the form of personalized concepts 
via a platform called MyGuide supporting and guiding prospective students on their 
way from their home country to the university of their choice in various host countries. 
Conclusion
All in all, digital change is not merely advancing technology, but organizational and sys-
tematic innovation that affects all areas of higher education and the educational sys-
tem. We should avoid isolated solutions, which might be the mistake of the past. All 
parts of universities will be affected, including the content of teaching, because in such 
unknown environments students will need new skills. And, last but not least, this devel-
opment asks for a new governance. We need a holistic strategic approach. This offers a 
completely new quality to internationalization. The university of the future will be an 
international university in all aspects, physically as well as virtually. 
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Globally Engaged and Locally 
Relevant: Revisiting Higher 
Education
Janet Ilieva and Vangelis Tsiligiris
H igher education institutions are grappling with COVID-19 outbreaks on campus, and travel conditions, limited flights, and health concerns are presenting challenges 
to mobility. To mitigate safety concerns, many universities have introduced a staggered 
return to campus with options for students to study online or with local partners based 
overseas, or to start the following term. Anecdotal evidence suggests that universities 
with flexible learning options are managing overseas student demand relatively well.
While solutions to pressures from all sides are short-term and focused on the current 
academic cycle, there are some long-term considerations for higher education institu-
tions and policy makers, which we are exploring in this article. 
Revisiting International Higher Education 
The current barriers to mobility are pressing students to reassess the value of inter-
national education. For educators, these barriers present an opportunity to repurpose 
their higher education offer. For too long, the global race for talent has been measured 
by the distribution of countries’ market share of international students and these stu-
dents’ economic contribution to the host country.
While the current environment favors remote learning and studying near to home, 
it also presents an opportunity to revisit the value of international education as seen 
through students’ lenses. This goes beyond graduation rates, employment outcomes, 
and life-changing experiences. Increasingly, globally minded students are environmen-
tally conscious, and their choice of study opportunities is no longer solely focused on 
career prospects. An institution’s carbon footprint and contribution to sustainable de-
velopment policies globally are likely to become critical decision-making factors for 
students. The question is whether this change will be demand driven, or whether high-
er education institutions will take leadership on this matter.
For too long, countries’ international education strategies have been export driven. 
Additionally, universities have adopted a rather simplistic approach when developing 
their internationalization strategies, which are often lacking critical evidence about the 
contextual factors that affect demand and supply of higher education. Internationali-
zation at home has growing importance and enables HEIs to develop globally minded 
citizens, particularly relevant to those without any international mobility experience.
Historically, even at times of global conflict and disruption, universities have been 
agents of international collaboration. Today, in a period during which the process of in-
ternationalization is challenged, the role of universities as “global social enterprises,” 
prioritizing social and environmental benefits and impact on a global scale over their 
own economic profit, is increasingly important. As part of their broader mandate to de-
velop and educate responsible citizens, universities play a paramount role in promoting 
inclusion, access to quality education, and sustainability. Such a role will become more 
prominent in the face of deepening social and economic inequalities globally.
Maintaining Local Relevance
Is it possible for a globally delivered degree to be locally relevant, and how can this bal-
ance be achieved? For decades, transnational education has facilitated the local deliv-
ery of international qualifications. In times of challenged mobility and travel, there is a 
growing scope for such delivery. The importance of local partners is heightened by the 
flexibility that they bring in terms of education delivery—locally facilitated teaching or 
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locally assisted online delivery models. In response to the pandemic crisis, some insti-
tutions have taken the initiative to offer “study abroad” options for international stu-
dents in their home country for a semester or longer, until travel conditions improve.
Cost-efficient study abroad options will enjoy growing popularity in the post-COVID-19 
recession, which will exert pressure on middle-class families and their ability to educate 
their children overseas. Near-to-home study options are an opportunity to continue to 
engage students locally through a network of trusted education partners.
At the same time, internationalization should not be considered as mutually exclusive 
to local relevance. The “future of work” and the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) shift 
the emphasis to soft skills, and particularly to personal qualities like adaptability and 
the ability of graduates to “connect the dots.” These soft skills require universities to pro-
vide a dynamic learning environment where students are placed outside of their comfort 
zone to discover, explore, and experiment with knowledge beyond their local context. 
Environmental Considerations
Engaging with students in their country of residence reduces HEIs’ carbon footprints 
significantly. Innovative ways of delivering education and quality assurance of remote-
ly delivered programs and assessment are already taking place.
The pandemic has brought into focus the significant environmental footprint of higher 
education, both in terms of student travel and academic staff mobility. Although there is 
a clear justification for the value of immersing an international student into the learn-
ing environment of a different country, there is now broad agreement that a substantial 
amount of academic staff mobility can be substituted by online collaboration.
The Way Forward
International student mobility is a valuable component of international higher educa-
tion. However, considering the costs and risks involved, an overseas study has to add 
unique value to the student’s experience. Universities need to assume more actively 
and transparently their role of global social enterprises. By embracing a global citizen-
ship education agenda, universities should aim to educate global citizens who can com-
prehend, pursue, and propagate key priorities for society in the twenty-first century. 
Even today, the location of the learner is used to distinguish between the different 
forms, and often the perceived value, of provision—e.g., local, international, or distance. 
Nevertheless, international higher education does not guarantee an internationalized 
learning experience. Equally, an internationalized learning experience is possible in lo-
cally delivered higher education. Thus, there needs to be a reconceptualization of in-
ternational higher education so that global citizenship is at the core of its provision, ir-
respective of the location of the student. Such provision aims to be locally embedded, 
globally relevant, and centered around the needs and ambitions of a diverse student 
population. It is through a global delivery model, environmentally conscious and with 
sustainable development and global citizenship at its heart, that international higher 
education can remain relevant in the future. 
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Germany: Policies for 
Internationalization
Sude Pekşen and Liudvika Leišytė
In recent years, Germany has become the fourth in top international destinations for study abroad in the world. The German federal government places emphasis on in-
ternationalizing the higher education (HE) landscape and is progressively adopting new 
policies in order to strengthen it with the support of a range of actors, especially through 
the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). 
Higher Education Internationalization in Germany: Foundational Values
German federal policy is built on the value of HE as a public good and traditionally pro-
motes a specific type of internationalization through cooperation, fostering academic 
freedom, contributing to development, and participating in efforts to solve global prob-
lems. The 2017 federal internationalization strategy focused on five targets: strengthening 
excellence through worldwide cooperation; developing Germany’s innovative strength 
internationally; expanding education and training internationally; shaping the global 
knowledge society together with emerging and developing countries; and lastly, over-
coming global challenges collectively. 
In line with these targets, the new DAAD strategy 2025 emphasizes these values by 
stressing the importance of international mobility exchanges, research networking and 
collaboration, and taking global responsibility and contributing to development and 
peace. These ambitious goals are supported with impressive funding for various inter-
nationalization projects and activities through the DAAD, the German research founda-
tion (DFG), or the federal ministry, and are implemented by research societies and high-
er education institutions (HEIs). Funding for international projects increased from EUR 
567 million in 2009 to EUR 1.05 billion in 2019.
Following the DAAD’s strategy, the German HE and research sector increases its at-
tractiveness by being a largely tuition-free system valuing knowledge exchange. It is 
committed to the academic success of international students and to increasing the 
share of foreign academic staff to 15 percent of its academic workforce through adver-
tising academic positions internationally. In recent years, information and marketing 
campaigns of the DAAD have aimed to promote world-class research, invest in interna-
tional partnerships through cooperative study programs, and fund German internation-
al universities abroad (e.g., in Bahrain, Egypt, and Thailand). The DAAD positions itself 
as a leader on the discourse on internationalization in HE and research and sees itself 
as an influential agent in science diplomacy. In 2019, the DAAD had an overall budget of 
EUR 594 million and gave stipends to 145,659 students, graduates, and faculty, including 
60,581 individuals from abroad and 85,078 individuals from Germany. The implementa-
tion of these ambitious strategies, however, depends on the HE systems of the 16 states 
(Länder) and the various HEIs. 
Measures at the Level of Individual States
Comparing statistics on incoming mobility in Germany by state in the winter semesters 
of 1998–1999 and 2019–2020, we can observe that overall, the numbers of international 
students increased in all states. The highest increase happened in former Eastern Ger-
man states (e.g., in Thuringia from 4 percent to 15 percent, Saxony-Anhalt from 4 per-
cent to 16 percent, and Saxony from 6 percent to 17 percent, while Berlin, the capital of 
the country, boomed from 13 percent to 22 percent). Further, we can also observe differ-
ences in tuition fees. In most of the states, higher education for international students 
is usually free, but some states have introduced tuition fees, such as Baden-Württem-
berg, where since the winter semester 2017–2018, non-EU students have been charged 
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EUR 1,500, or in Bavaria, where fees are charged to students who participate exclusive-
ly in study offers at branch campuses located outside the European Union, e.g., study 
programs at the Technical University of Munich Asia in Singapore. We can also see that 
different HEIs pursue different strategies when it comes to branch campuses, attracting 
and recruiting foreign academics, and supporting refugees via state-supported funding 
initiatives. All these measures point to soft power exercised by the states beyond legal 
frameworks, which are instruments of hard power.
A closer look at the legislation of all the states allows us to see that international-
ization is largely promoted by the state ministries for education through performance 
agreements with HEIs, while new laws provide general frameworks. For example, in Meck-
lenburg-Western Pomerania, the new law of 2019 calls for improvement in the quality of 
HEIs, to make them more attractive to international students and faculty, and according 
to a new state law in Rhineland-Palatinate enacted in 2020, a Higher Education Forum 
will be established to strengthen cooperation and exchange between the state and HEIs 
on internationalization.
Importantly, performance agreements are linked to the funding of HEIs—thus here, 
concrete incentives are at play. For example, a recent agreement between Hamburg and 
the Hamburg University of Technology includes a 10 percent incoming and outgoing stu-
dent quota, while in Bavaria, the Technical University of Munich has agreed to increase 
the number of North American students by 2022.
Future Perspectives of Internationalization in German Higher Education
The current federal and DAAD strategies, continuous commitment to internationaliza-
tion through substantial state funding, and the overall increase in the importance of 
internationalization in all states allows us to assume that the German government, as 
well as all major stakeholders, are seriously committed to being globally competitive in 
terms of HE, science, and innovation. Global leadership based on long-standing tradi-
tions seems to work through both soft- and hard-power approaches, depending on the 
policy level. One can observe certain measures promoting internationalization in state 
HE laws; thus, a hard-power approach through coercion seems to be used to some ex-
tent. At the federal level, we observe a range of nonbinding, yet supportive measures to 
promote internationalization, such as guidelines, strategy papers, and financial policy 
instruments; thus, a soft-power approach is used at the federal level through agenda 
setting, benchmarking exercises, and information policy instruments. We also observe 
that competition seems to drive important changes at the level of the states as well as 
of the HEIs, such as the introduction of tuition fees or increased assertiveness in at-
tracting international students and scholars, Berlin being a clear leader in this regard.
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the development of internationalization 
is highly uncertain and facing serious challenges. Some countries are refusing entry to 
foreign nationals, and the DAAD is advising against travel abroad to high-risk areas. Cur-
rent developments point to the possibility of new measures by policy makers and fund-
ing agencies to promote internationalization in the virtual space. At the same time, it is 
unlikely that Germany’s overall approach toward internationalization will change in the 
near future, as the aims of cooperation, academic freedom, and contribution to global 
development are anchored in the core value of higher education as a public good. 
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South Africa: Developing an 
Internationalization Policy
Nico Jooste and Cornelius Hagenmeier
A policy that would focus and guide the internationalization of the South African higher education system was not part of the guidance provided by the National 
Commission on Higher Education (NCE) in its 1996 report. What it indicated, however, 
was that South African higher education, emerging from a period of relative isolation, 
would have to produce the skills and technological innovations necessary for the country 
to successfully participate in the global market. Internationalizing South African high-
er education was left to the university sector, as the national government was focusing 
on other activities meant to transform the racially defined and fragmented system into 
a unitary system.
The International Education Association of South Africa (IEASA) conference of 2003 
provided the system with the impetus to start paying attention to the need for a nation-
al policy. The rationales behind a national policy were the transformation of education 
as an international phenomenon; the need to address regional demands, in particu-
lar from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and challenges posed by 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union; and the 
necessity to address the country’s skills development needs in the context of globali-
zation. It was, however, not until 2012 that the national department of higher education 
(DHET) initiated the drafting process.
An intensive public participation process accompanied the development of the pol-
icy framework. The DHET engaged national and international experts to develop a first 
concept paper. Meetings were arranged with representatives of public South African 
universities to discuss their proposals for a structure of the planned policy framework. 
The views of universities and national and global experts were considered in the draft-
ing process, and several public workshops were conducted to explain the policy as a 
steering mechanism.
The Policy Framework
The policy framework is grounded in the 2012 National Development Plan and other na-
tional policy documents. It gives effect to the commitments that the country made in 
terms of the 1997 SADC Protocol on Education and Training. It aims to provide “a national 
framework for internationalisation of higher education within which higher education 
institutions can develop and align their institutional internationalisation policies and 
strategies.” All higher education institutions have to develop policies or strategies for 
internationalization and provide appropriate administration and support for interna-
tionalization. Strengthening internationalization at historically disadvantaged institu-
tions is of particular concern.
The duty of institutions to consider national priorities is balanced with a guaran-
tee of academic freedom enshrined in the constitution. The policy embraces mutuali-
ty, complementarity, quality, legal compliance, and ethics as structural principles. The 
government is not allowed to steer internationalization directly, but is rather assigned 
an enabling role. Higher education institutions are required to report on their progress 
in terms of internationalization in their annual performance plans, measured against 
goals that they have set for themselves. 
The policy considers internationalization of research a priority. Internationalization 
should benefit all students, not only those who partake in mobility: Internationaliza-
tion at home is prioritized, curriculum internationalization becomes mandatory. The in-
ternationalization process is viewed as an opportunity to take local and/or indigenous 
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knowledge to the international community, thus the involvement of local communities 
in the higher education internationalization process is encouraged. 
Adherence to strict ethical standards for international student mobility is required. A 
framework for cross-border and collaborative provision of higher education is provided, 
but only private higher education institutions are permitted to set up branch campuses 
abroad. In principle, cobadged, joint-, and consecutive qualifications are allowed, but 
double degrees remain prohibited. Financing internationalization is considered mainly 
an institutional responsibility, and institutions are encouraged to “design self-sustain-
ability into their internationalisation activities.”
 The publication of the draft policy in April 2017 raised the expectations of South 
African universities that a policy would be in place to guide them and provide a legal 
framework to offer international joint- and double degrees. It was also expected that 
the policy would assist previously disadvantaged universities in playing a more critical 
role in higher education internationalization, but because of its delayed implementation, 
institutional inequalities inherited from the apartheid system were allowed to continue. 
Continuing Historical Imbalances
International student numbers, as an indicator of the level of internationalization, illus-
trate this clearly. The student data of universities identified as Historically White Uni-
versities (HWUs) and Historically Black or Disadvantaged Institutions (HDIs) tells the fol-
lowing story. In 2018, HDIs accommodated 23 percent of all South African students, but 
only 9 percent of all international students. Compared to the total number of interna-
tional students in South Africa, the number of international students at HDIs has been 
declining annually. In 2018, the HDIs’ student body only included 2.5 percent interna-
tional students—far below the norm and system average of 7 percent. In contrast, the 
international student to local student ratio at HWUs was 10 percent, significantly more, 
and HWUs also registered more than 60 percent of all international students. This ine-
quality is inherited from the past. It is also closely linked to leadership and the capacity 
of institutions to respond to international opportunities.
Higher Education Institutions Still Lead the Way
Leadership changes in government departments, diverging stakeholder views, and the 
COVID-19 pandemic caused delays with the finalization of the policy framework. In the 
absence of a formal policy, many universities still embarked on strengthening interna-
tionalization at home and internationalization of the curriculum, and aligning their in-
stitutional strategies according to the draft policy. They are strengthening institutional 
support structures and developing reporting structures for internationalization. Some 
are attempting to involve local communities in the internationalization process. Thus, 
the draft South African policy framework has already made a substantive contribution 
to strengthening the internationalization of higher education, and at least some uni-
versities are well prepared for its implementation. The publication of the policy in early 
November 2020 paved the way for internationalization to become one of the transfor-
mational drivers of the South African education system. The real impact of the policy 
will only be seen in years to come. The next challenge is now for the DHET to develop 
an imaginative implementation plan. If successfully implemented, the policy can con-
tribute to overcoming historical imbalances in South African higher education interna-
tionalization and become a model for internationalization in the developing world. 
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Internationalization and 
India’s New Education Policy
N.V. Varghese and Eldho Mathews
While the waves of globalization seem to be receding, the call for international-ization is on the rise. Many countries view internationalization as a strategy to 
gain academic credibility and increase the global competitiveness of national educa-
tion systems. Internationalization implies cross-border mobility of programs, students, 
institutions, and faculty.  Cross-border mobility is guided by economic rationales and 
mediated through market processes.
This article argues that India’s efforts to internationalize higher education do not 
seem to be motivated by market processes, but by a wish to extend its soft power and 
increase the country’s global role. The New Education Policy 2020 (NEP 2020) reflects this 
perspective and prioritizes internationalization in order to promote Indian education 
abroad and facilitate the establishment of foreign higher education institutions in India.
India’s Approach to Internationalization: Main Turning Points
During the postindependence period, Indian development strategy emphasized political 
sovereignty and economic self-reliance. The latter implied technological self-reliance, 
as reflected by the establishment of higher education institutions of technology. India 
relied on external funding and expertise to establish the Indian Institutes of Technolo-
gy (IITs), and on educating its nationals abroad to train the first generation of teachers 
in higher education. For instance, while IIT Bombay received help from the former So-
viet Union, IIT Madras and IIT Delhi were established with the support of former West 
Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively.
India offers around 3,940 scholarships every year through the Indian Council for Cul-
tural Relations (ICCR) to foreign students from about 140 countries to promote cultural 
understanding, and has signed cooperation agreements within the field of education 
with 54 countries. Yet it has taken the country decades to issue a clearly articulated pol-
icy on internationalization. Two earlier national policies on education (NEP 1968 and 
NEP 1986) were relatively silent on this issue. An internationalization strategy was ar-
ticulated for the first time when the University Grants Commission (UGC) introduced a 
program for the “Promotion of Indian Higher Education Abroad” (PIHEAD) in 2002. This 
proposal was shelved, since the Task Force of 2004 did not wish to see the Indian high-
er education system subjected to global competition under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) framework. The UGC plan for internationalization of 2009 was 
also constrained with respect to internationalization, for lack of legislative measures. A 
bill seeking permission for foreign education providers to establish campuses in India 
was presented in parliament in 2010. This bill did not pass either. 
NEP 2020 is the first national policy that gives priority to internationalization. Its vi-
sion is for India to become a global study destination and an education hub to attract 
international students. In a major shift in policy orientation, NEP 2020 recommends the 
establishment of branch campuses by top-ranking foreign universities (from among the 
top 100 in world university rankings). 
NEP 2020 also envisages highly performing Indian universities setting up branch 
campuses abroad. Many private Indian universities already have branch campuses in 
a number of countries. According to the Cross-Border Education Research Team’s lat-
est international campus listing, Indian institutions have branch campuses in countries 
such as Australia, Mauritius, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Uzbekistan. Thanks to NEP 2020, select public and private institutions may also estab-
lish a presence abroad from now on. Regulations introduced by the UGC in January 2021 
allow the category of “Institutions of Eminence Deemed to be Universities” to establish 
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foreign campuses with the approval of the government. The liberalization of regulations 
on branch campuses and stimulation of credit transfer possibilities (between Indian in-
stitutions and institutions abroad) emphasized in NEP 2020 will help increase student 
flows to and from India.
Expectations vs. Reality
The NEP 2020 condition that India will only welcome branch campuses from top-ranking 
institutions may act as a constraint against expanding the scope of institutional mobili-
ty to India. Informal discussions with officials at some top-ranking institutions indicate 
that only a few are keen to establish campuses in India, for several reasons. First, they 
are likely to continue to focus their efforts on retaining, if not improving, their place in 
global rankings. Second, their decision would be driven by the profitability of invest-
ments: There is a need for more clarity on their authority to decide the level of student 
fees. Third, legal provisions regarding repatriation of income generated by foreign pro-
viders are still unclear. Fourth, many of these institutions are welcoming Indian students 
in their home campuses, with a financial benefit that is arguably higher than what they 
would levy in India with a branch campus. 
How will the provisions in the policy affect student flows? According to the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 375,055 Indian students were studying abroad in 2018. Their mo-
tivation for studying abroad is highly influenced by poststudy employment opportuni-
ties in host countries. Hence, their favorite study destinations are the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. They make a calculation between the high 
cost of their studies and potential high returns. A degree from a foreign branch campus 
located in India may not satisfy their aspirations for poststudy employment and high 
returns on investments. 
Are the NEP 2020 recommendations likely to help India emerge as a higher educa-
tion hub? India hosts currently around 47,000 international students, mostly from South 
Asia and Africa. Many of them are attracted to India because of access to better quality 
education than at home, at a low cost. But India does not provide many employment 
opportunities and when provided, the salary is not very attractive. In other words, the 
economic logic that guides Indian students going abroad may not be a reliable frame-
work by which to understand the logic of foreign students coming to India. 
India is aspiring to play a global role and education may be a supporting sector in 
that process. Therefore, India has been making serious efforts in recent years to in-
crease the flow of inbound international students by extending scholarships under the 
“Study in India” program launched in 2018. India plans to host nearly 500,000 interna-
tional students by 2024, 10 percent among them on attractive government scholarships. 
The provision of scholarships is an indication of India’s interest to play a global role.
Another area envisaged in NEP 2020 is the promotion of research collaborations and 
faculty exchanges between Indian and foreign institutions. India launched a Scheme 
for Promotion of Academic and Research Collaboration (SPARC) in 2018, to strength-
en academic and research collaborations with select countries. Another program, the 
Global Initiative for Academic Networks (GIAN), was successful in attracting more than 
1,283 scholars from 56 countries to Indian higher education institutions between 2015 
and 2019. These collaborations are seen as reliable and sustainable ways to promote 
internationalization.
Conclusion
To fulfil its vision, India needs to put in place legislative measures and incentives to attract in-
stitutions and students. While its large diaspora, especially in Gulf countries, is a good source 
of demand for international education, the country will be able to develop into an education 
hub only when attracting a sizeable number of international students from a diverse range 
of countries. While market-mediated, cross-border mobility may not work in favor of India, 
government initiatives such as extending scholarships may be an effective measure. Further, 
online courses through India’s MOOC platforms such as SWAYAM (Study Webs of Active Learn-
ing for Young Aspiring Minds) may also have the potential to attract foreign students in large 
numbers. Needless to say, COVID-19 has considerably stimulated online learning among stu-
dents in India and abroad. This is a new reality on which India can capitalize. 
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Brexit is Done: What Next for 
UK Higher Education?
Anne Corbett
Legally, the Brexit deal is done. It comes in three parts, all of which deeply affect the sphere of UK higher education and research. Two are international treaties between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union. The third is a national affair: the choice 
of the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, and his government.
The Deal with the European Union
The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement frames the terms of the divorce, taking away the four 
freedoms around which the European Union has been constructed: freedom of move-
ment for capital, goods, services, and people. Gone are the automatic rights that for 
nearly 50 years came with EU membership to study, work, and live in any nation of the 
European Union. Gone too are associated freedoms, such as the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications, linked to the freedom of establishment.
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) defines the political deal as cut by the 
United Kingdom with the European Union. It lays out the grounds for trade and politi-
cal cooperation with the European Union. The higher education sector interest here is 
that it covers education and research.
The United Kingdom is to remain in the European Union’s Horizon program, a much 
appreciated program designed to support excellence in science and innovation, and in 
highly specialized research organizations, including Euratom, ITER, and Copernicus. The 
Horizon decision (Horizon Europe in its new version) is especially sweet since, due to the 
European Union’s recent internationalizing reform, the United Kingdom will participate 
on almost the same terms as before, once the United Kingdom’s financial contribution 
is settled. That includes guaranteed access to European Research Council grants and 
the research fellowships of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions. The Horizon decision is 
also welcome for the humanities and social sciences which, in national terms, lose out 
to STEM subjects. Horizon funds go to minority subjects like archaeology and classics, 
and specialized institutions such as those in the arts and music.
The Erasmus program is not part of the deal, despite a prime ministerial government 
promise. The government has instead launched a more modest made-in-Britain scheme 
(see article by Guibert and Rayón in this issue). In Northern Ireland (NI), the Republic 
of Ireland has come to the rescue in treating NI students as their own. Scotland and 
Wales were reflecting on how they too could stay in—but their ambitions were dashed.
Immigration Policy
The UK sector was highly globally connected before Brexit. But while Brexit changes the 
rules, how much it will change the numbers of incoming students and academics is an 
open question.
Universities UK statistics from 2017 (before COVID-19) show the United Kingdom as 
leader in the field. Non-United Kingdom students and academics were almost 21 percent 
of the United Kingdom’s 2.4 million total. Over 91,000 of these are from China, roughly 
the same as from the 27 members of the European Union combined, and just 16,700 are 
from the United States. Almost 30 percent of academics are non-British. 
Outside short visitor stays, visas will now be the norm. All non-British academics or 
students hoping to work or study in UK universities will be subject to newly revised im-
migration rules. For academia, there are three types of visa: student visas; skilled worker 
visas; and global talent visas. A new graduate visa is in preparation. EU citizens in Britain 
before December 31, 2020, will now need to be approved for settled status. 
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While new EU students will now be subject to the high fees already charged to in-
ternational students, EU citizens and their children already in Britain will be eligible 
for home fees. There are, however, details still to be settled. Universities UK is the best 
source for up-to-date information. For British citizens wanting to study or research in 
EU member states, there already exists an EU Directive of 2018 covering researchers, 
students, and interns from third countries. It is part of the drive to make the European 
Union an attractive destination for talent.
The Trade Dimension
Internationalization has been a crucial source of UK higher education funding. The fees 
of international students subsidize UK teaching and research. There are over 400,000 
international students in Britain and 666,000 international students working for British 
degrees delivered outside Britain (49 percent in Asia). The phenomenon of transnation-
al education (TNE) takes in branch campuses, UK-local university partnerships, as well 
as other forms of study. Higher education earns GBP 10.8 billion in expert earnings, a 
figure that has almost doubled since 2013. Its internationalization activities have cre-
ated over 200,000 jobs.
Brexit is inspiring the UK government to take internationalization further. Higher edu-
cation will be integral to the new and revised trade deals intended to orient trade away 
from Europe to the Pacific, once the United Kingdom is accepted into the Comprehen-
sive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). While the CPTPP is projected to 
grow fast, the present trade gap between it and the European Union is enormous. Just 
8 percent of UK trade in goods and 9 percent of trade in services goes to the CPTPP. For-
ty-three percent of trade goes to the European Union.
Where Does Brexit Leave UK Higher Education?
In the post-Brexit world, the default setting for UK policy is the 2017 Higher Education 
and Research Act. This Act strengthens government control over the sector with the 
aim of making UK higher education institutions more competitive at home and abroad.
It allows the government to play a more strategic role in the funding of research. To 
this end, the Act brought the long-existing discipline-dominated research councils under 
a single body, UK Research and Innovation (UKRI). The Act is an encouragement to new 
higher education providers, or, as some would put it, puts a brake on a university mo-
nopoly. It has removed the distinctions between public and for-profit higher education 
providers. The Act also sets the scene for a category of teaching-only (undergraduate 
degree) universities. In doing so, it has broken the organic link between the university’s 
traditional educational and research functions, most dramatically at the doctoral level. 
Not all universities will now be able to award the Doctor of Philosophy degree (PhD), 
one of their distinguishing characteristics. 
The Act makes the government the degree-awarding authority (though not expect-
ed to interfere with the historic pattern designed to underscore university autonomy). 
Students explicitly become customers under a new Office for Students. Universities are 
rated under a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF).
Developments during the almost five years since the Brexit referendum suggest re-
search will be subject to gentler treatment than teaching and learning. In acceding 
to the seven-year Horizon program, the UK government has followed the advice of a 
high-level report, Changes and Choices, that Brexit policy should focus on damage lim-
itation before changing direction. The keywords were stabilization—transition—vision. 
But there is no parallel strategy report for the other missions of the university to ease 
the post-Brexit transition.
We can expect that Brexit will speed up changes in the university sector already im-
plicit in the 2017 Act, that is, a growing gap between the global research universities and 
the rest. But how universities see new opportunities for trade in services will also mark 
their future. UK universities, historically united epistemically in their commitment to 
the creation and transmission of knowledge, will be coming to terms with Brexit ramifi-
cations for some time. Brexit is not just a matter of the law. It is an ongoing process. 
Anne Corbett is senior associate at 
LSE Consultancy, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 
UK. Email: a.corbett@lse.ac.uk.
Earlier versions of this article 
appeared on the LSE Brexit blog 



















iNTERNATiONAL HigHER EDUCATiON | BRITISH POST-BREXIT DILEMMAS
UK’s Turing Scheme: The 
Challenges Ahead
José M. Guibert and Alex Rayón
The future of multilateralism in a world that currently exhibits strong unilateral ten-dencies is not clear. But in some fields, such as higher education, these last dec-
ades have shown that institutions collaborating in networks can achieve significant re-
sults. The Erasmus exchange program is a clear example. But the 2020 Christmas Eve 
Agreement will mark for posterity the day on which the United Kingdom formalized its 
exit from the Erasmus program.
The movie The Imitation Game is about the life of Alan Turing. Born in 1912, this Brit-
on is considered the forerunner of modern computing. In World War II, Turing managed 
to decipher the Nazi codes, in particular those of the Enigma machine. The period of 
peace that the Western world has been enjoying for over 75 years is in part a result of 
his achievement. Little could Turing imagine that, several decades later, the new inter-
national mobility exchange scheme that the British government is setting up after Brexit 
would be named after him.
From a Multilateral Program to Bilateral Agreements
Boris Johnson himself repeatedly stated that the Erasmus program, which has contrib-
uted so much socially, culturally, and educationally to Europe and its citizens, would 
not be in jeopardy. Put simply, aside from granting scholarships, Erasmus stimulates 
and facilitates mobility and standardizes institutional processes and credit recognition 
among its 33 member countries, including non-EU members like Iceland, Norway, Ser-
bia, and Turkey.
Mobility may also be organized through bilateral agreements. However, these require 
significantly more work and make it more difficult to find scholarships for students. In 
response to these challenges, the Turing scheme is expected to be endowed with GBP 
100 million (around USD 135 million), and it is announced that it will open the doors to 
the world’s best universities. But the Turing scheme will face hurdles—we have already 
identified a few, presented below.
The Challenges Ahead for the United Kingdom
First, the complex management that bilateral agreements require is clearly being un-
derestimated. Agreeing on credit transfer, language course offer (a common demand 
of exchange students), academic calendar, and data protection, to name the most rel-
evant, takes considerable time, especially with destinations such as Australia, Cana-
da, or the United States, with their different academic regulations, requirements, and 
school calendars.
Second, the scheme may face difficulties in promoting social justice and mobility. 
There is substantial empirical evidence of the benefits of an international experience: 
It helps develop greater self-confidence, a more open and comprehensive perspective, 
and lifelong connections; it improves language skills; it strengthens one’s appreciation 
of diversity; and it provides an intercultural understanding of a globalized world. The 
Erasmus+ Higher Education Impact study also provides evidence as to how it increases 
job prospects and secures better salaries. This is especially important for students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. Erasmus gives more scholarships to those who need them 
the most: students from low-income households or with disabilities.
To match these achievements, the Turing scheme will be depending on British insti-
tutions securing appropriate partner universities. Furthermore, reciprocity is key: The 
British government has so far only committed itself to funding outgoing student mo-
bility. In exchange programs such as Erasmus, reciprocity is essential and universities 
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take great care when developing partnerships, seeking to achieve a balance between 
outgoing and incoming flows. This is where the United Kingdom is at a disadvantage: It 
has a high cost of living; study visas remain undefined; and incoming students are ap-
parently not included in the Turing scheme. If their students are not covered, what in-
centive will overseas institutions have to cooperate with Turing?
Another issue is related to the payoff of participating in the Erasmus program. Ac-
cording to UK government data, the revenue received through UK educational exports is 
close to GBP 440 million in living expenses in 2018, a 71 percent increase since 2010. Over 
30,000 students and trainees have come to the United Kingdom through Erasmus each 
year (out of about 200,000 students participating in the program every year), spending 
money on food, accommodation, travel, and leisure activities. The United Kingdom is 
also a very popular destination for teachers and administrative staff. In terms of outgo-
ing mobility, the European Commission’s Annual Erasmus+ Report recorded over 18,000 
UK students benefiting from an Erasmus+ study or work placement in 2018–2019. With 
regard to the research and innovation program, Horizon 2020, the United Kingdom is 
the second-largest recipient. 
These figures reflect the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as an educational 
partner country. Cultural and linguistic factors are the most important drivers influ-
encing student decisions to study abroad. In the present context, the time it has taken 
the British government to present its new initiative may work against its universities. 
European students may now be aiming for Ireland or countries that offer undergradu-
ate and graduate programs entirely in English, such as the Netherlands. The impact of 
such a “leakage” on UK institutions will be challenging from a variety of perspectives.
The United Kingdom is planning for its new scheme to be up and running from Sep-
tember 2021. But, as mentioned above, setting up partnerships with universities outside 
the Erasmus framework will take time and a huge amount of negotiation—a very cum-
bersome task in the midst of a pandemic. And, last but not least, geography presents a 
challenge. Culturally and linguistically, the destinations closest to the British Isles, out-
side of Europe, are separated by oceans and continents. This implies considerable time 
differences (a burden to communication), expensive travel costs, and, above all, differ-
ent educational contexts. Apart from that, encouraging student travel to distant desti-
nations that are unreachable by train or other sustainable means of transportation will 
have a huge impact on the environment.
Conclusion
Democracy has once again raised a paradox: Those young British people who did not 
vote in the Brexit referendum, or voted to leave, may be forced to pay a very expensive 
price. International mobility experience is more than just spending a semester away from 
home. It is about opening up to a world that inexorably, once the pandemic is over, will 
be more global and intercultural than ever. That is why we find more challenges than 
opportunities for the new Turing scheme, compared to the well-established and accred-
ited Erasmus program. 
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Russian Academic Excellence—A 
Long Struggle
Philip G. Altbach
In 2013, the Russian government established the Russian Academic Excellence Project, generally referred to as the “5–100 Project” because one of the aims of the enterprise 
was to catapult five Russian universities into the top 100 of the global university rank-
ings. The primary goals, however, were to transform several top Russian universities into 
globally competitive research universities and to encourage internationalization. While 
the program, which is now completing its work, failed to achieve the desired rankings, 
much else was accomplished. Twenty-one Russian universities were selected from a 
larger group of applicants by an international council, and USD 2.3 billion was invested 
in these institutions over seven years, averaging around 9 percent of the annual univer-
sity budgets. The government is now discussing a new initiative to further improve Rus-
sian universities. It is worth examining some of the successes—and failures—of 5–100.
The Russian Context
Russia’s higher education system is large and varied, with a complex and troubled 
past preceding new, contemporary challenges. There are 4 million students in Russia’s 
724 universities—one of the world’s largest academic systems—with 73 percent of high 
school graduates continuing on to higher education. While many of the top universities 
are concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, excellent universities are also scattered 
across the country’s vast hinterland. Russia’s complex history continues to haunt current 
reality. During the Soviet period, higher education was harnessed for the needs of the 
state, with no autonomy and ideologically subservient to the Communist Party. Most of 
the traditional multidisciplinary universities were divided into smaller, focused institu-
tions serving specific industries and ministries. Universities focused almost exclusively 
on teaching while research was conducted separately at institutes managed by the So-
viet Academy of Science, largely ending a tradition that combined teaching and research 
at universities. (There were some exceptions: Several universities founded during the 
Cold War were research intensive.) Higher education was closely linked to the economic 
planning apparatus. Unsurprisingly, the entire academic and scientific system became 
highly bureaucratic. Further, academic links to the rest of the world were few—Soviet ac-
ademe functioned in its own isolated universe. Despite the severe restrictions, several 
universities and research institutes, especially in such fields as physics and mathemat-
ics, were world-class, and the system, however flawed, had considerable influence in 
the larger, global Soviet sphere of influence. Further, there was significant accomplish-
ment in fields related to the technical and military spheres.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, politics and the economy entered into a 
decade of severe instability. Universities and research institutes lost most of their gov-
ernment funding, and with few exceptions, standards collapsed and infrastructure de-
teriorated. For the first time in 70 years, academics and students had contact with the 
rest of the world and many chose to leave, never to return. Corruption, always a part 
of the Soviet system, flourished, as institutions and academics sought to survive in the 
context of economic constraint and political uncertainty. 
 Elements of the Soviet system continue to weigh heavily on Russian higher educa-
tion and science, including high levels of bureaucracy and the bifurcation of teaching 
and research—despite significant efforts and some success at reforms.
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An Awakening—Of Sorts
By 2000, the Russian government and society recognized that academe and research 
were in crisis—at the same time that a modicum of stability was restored in society and 
oil revenues and the revival of industry provided renewed resources. Corruption was to 
an extent reined in. For example, an out of control corrupt student admission system 
was replaced by the Unified State Examination system in 2009 and it has worked well. 
Some Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) institutes were renting out space to private 
companies, a questionable and perhaps illegal practice, and this was ended. Problems 
continue, however. Recent reports of senior provincial politicians purchasing doctoral 
dissertations are an example.
Budgets for universities and the RAS were significantly, although still inadequately, 
improved. Greater importance has been given to research. Based on national competi-
tions, 29 of the best universities were upgraded to “national research universities” and 
provided with additional funding. The government has provided support for interna-
tional labs in Russian universities headed by prominent global researchers who spend 
time in Russia. Some prominent Russian academics who had emigrated have returned 
as lab heads. Guidance to modernize academic management was provided and faculty 
salaries, which had dramatically deteriorated after 1991, were increased, although still 
inadequate by international standards. As a result of all of these changes, academic 
productivity increased.
The 5–100 Initiative and Higher Education Reform
The accomplishments of the 5–100 program have been significant, especially considering 
the challenge of improving universities anywhere, and particularly in the Russian con-
text. Perhaps most important, 5–100 signified that creating world-class research-orient-
ed universities in Russia is a key national goal. The funds allocated, while by no means 
transformative, were significant. Funds were allocated on the basis of specific academic 
plans and performance was carefully monitored—the universities were forced to think 
strategically and were then evaluated. Universities were required to spend their 5–100 
funds on specific development projects. Over time, a history of academic planning with 
vague and unrealistic goals was replaced by more realistic and practical goal setting. As 
the program developed, the most successful universities received additional funding, 
while some others got less. Seminars for university leaders and others aimed at im-
proving management, enhancing internationalization, and generating new ideas were 
organized. Senior management and other key academic personnel from the participat-
ing universities met to discuss common problems, and an atmosphere of friendly com-
petition developed.
Recent studies document that productivity increased both at 5–100 universities and 
at other universities as well—the investment is paying off in terms of more and better 
research, the fulfillment of strategic goals, and the modernization of university leader-
ship. Other Russian universities that seek to improve their prestige and develop a re-
search profile are benchmarking against the 5–100 institutions.
Limited but Notable Accomplishments
The 5–100 program was limited to 21 universities deemed to have the best potential for 
development into internationally competitive research universities. According to objec-
tive measures, all have made some progress, but results for at least a third of the group 
have been modest. A few have tried to “game the system” rather than produce measur-
able results. The top universities, however, have moved rapidly to join the ranks of key 
research universities worldwide. While a few of the universities have constructively in-
volved Russian Academy of Sciences institutes, by and large the RAS has not been af-
fected by reform and remains locked in the Soviet past.
Although none of the 5–100 universities have joined the upper reaches of the glob-
al rankings—too much emphasis was placed on these rankings and their metrics any-
way—some improvements were made and several of the 5–100 institutions have done 
well in some of the subject matter rankings. Russia will need to pay serious attention 
to the rest of its sprawling higher education system, much of which remains of rath-
er low quality. In this respect Russia is similar to most other emerging economies. Top 
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research universities are of course important, but they are a small part of a complex 
higher education system further complicated by the challenges of a huge country ge-
ographically, with weak institutions in many provincial areas. It is important to keep in 
mind that Russian universities have only rejoined the global higher education space in 
the past few decades, and even now international links and collaboration remain limited. 
This is a requirement for any hope that Russia has of building world-class universities.
 What is clear is that Russia is one of the world’s main higher education systems, with 
a huge reservoir of top talent. If Russia wants to join the community of top universities, 
succeed in making significant research contributions, and educate people for a sophis-
ticated economy, it needs world-class research universities. The 5–100 program has been 
a good start in that direction. Now, with planning for an additional initiative under way, 
and with careful thinking and appropriate resources, Russia may be able to achieve the 
next step toward its ambitious goals. 
Russian Higher Education and 
the Demographic Revolution
Niyaz Gabdrakhmanov and Oleg Leshukov
Russia faces significant changes in its higher education system because of rather unique circumstances: an overall decline in the population, but an increase in num-
bers of university-age youth. Currently, the Russian tertiary education system is one of 
the world leaders in terms of massification. This is true both in terms of total number 
of students and gross enrollment ratio. The total number of students in Russia in 2019 
was 4.2 million. The percentage of individuals aged 25 to 64 enrolled in tertiary educa-
tion ranks fourth in the world, behind only South Korea, Japan, and Canada. Such a high 
enrollment rate is a consequence of the massification of university education that took 
place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The number of universities has doubled 
over the past 20 years since the establishment of the Russian Federation: At its peak, 
in 2006, the Russian education system included 1,314 universities (and more than 1,500 
branches of these universities).
Unfortunately, the rapid growth in the number of institutions has led to the emer-
gence of a low-quality segment of higher education. To meet this challenge, in 2011, the 
government launched a special program aiming to optimize university networks. As a 
result, in 2017, the total number of colleges and universities was halved, while the num-
ber of branch campuses fell by 65 percent. 
These structural changes coincided with a general reduction of the student popu-
lation, due to demographic factors. Over this period, the number of students fell by 35 
percent. However, the forecast for 2019 indicates again a growth in the population of 
young people, and this trend is expected to continue over the next 15 years. The rela-
tively fast growth in the number of youth is likely to lead to increasing demand for high-
er education and will have a significant impact on the system.
A Risk of Decreasing Access
The predicted growth in the population of young people in Russia will lead to a risk of 
decreasing access to higher education. While the overall population will fall by 3.7 mil-
lion by 2036, the population of 17 to 21-year-olds is projected to increase, as a result of 
Russia’s emergence from the demographic collapse of the 1990s. The majority of Russian 
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students fall into this age range and their population segment will grow by 15 percent 
by 2024 and by 45 percent by 2036.
Another important feature is that the majority of high-school graduates continue their 
education at colleges and universities. Today, more than 70 percent of school graduates 
choose this path. This means that in the current situation of a substantial decrease in 
the number of educational organizations combined with a steady demographic growth 
of youth, educational accessibility may significantly decrease. More school graduates 
are likely to be pushed into the segment of vocational education.
Regional Differentiation and Differences in Demographics
Regional differentiation within Russia is high and there are major differences in demo-
graphic trends across the country. The fact that colleges and universities are located in 
large cities creates strong incentives for young people to move to these education hubs. 
Surveys show that people tend to consider large cities as providing higher quality edu-
cation and offering greater opportunities for personal growth. As a result, only a fourth 
of Russian regions are attracting young people, whose migration has tripled over the 
past few years. This is partly a result of the adoption of the “unified state exam” in 2001 
(a compulsory exam for everyone planning to enter a university), which has expanded 
the educational opportunities for applicants to enroll in universities outside of their 
home region. At the same time, this expansion has led to the draining of young people 
from most regions, which poses a serious threat to the stability of regional development.
Still, the situation may change in the near future, insofar as most regions are on the 
verge of experiencing a significant increase in the number of young people. This gives 
hope that at least some of the young population that has tended to move to more de-
veloped centers of education in recent years will now stay in their home regions.
It is also important to consider the effects of demographic trends on Russia’s more 
attractive cities and regions. One quarter of all students and one third of all universities 
in the country are concentrated in two cities—Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This une-
ven geographic distribution of centers of higher learning creates disparities in young 
people’s educational opportunities. The current demographic trends are posing another 
challenge to families: increasing competition for places at universities in regions that are 
experiencing an influx of young people from other regions. Access to higher education 
will therefore decrease for graduates of high schools in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, 
as they will be forced to compete with graduates from across Russia.
Conclusion
In Russia, demographic revolutions have a direct impact on access to higher education. 
The COVID-19 pandemic and current economic crisis are likely to further exacerbate dif-
ferences in socioeconomic status among young people. The most disadvantaged groups 
may face the greatest decrease in access to universities. Choosing a strategy of minimiz-
ing risks and reducing financial costs, families may redirect on local higher education 
markets and choose universities within their native regions. But in the current condi-
tions of reduced higher education capacity, especially in remote regions (caused by op-
timizations of university networks), this can also lead to decreased access.
The government has recently taken a series of steps to even out these growing dis-
parities. One important measure is the increase in the number of federally funded stu-
dent places, which will rise by 28 percent between 2020 and 2024. This initiative will be 
specifically targeted at improving access to education in regions outside Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg. Other measures aim to expand online education formats and create 
national platforms for online courses and educational resources. This spread of online 
education may help improve access and change educational migration patterns. 
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Are China’s “Sea Turtles” 
Becoming “Seaweed”? A 
Changing Job Market
David Zweig and Zaichao Du
Analysts of “reverse migration” emphasize the importance of talented people with a foreign PhD, who engage in cutting-edge research that enhances national power. 
But what of the millions who go abroad for a short-term master degree?
Compared with Chinese overseas students who are funded by the state, self-paying 
master students (MAs) are generally regarded as less capable. While returnees with ad-
vanced degrees are called “hai gui,” or “returning sea turtles,” people returning from 
“overseas” (hai) who are “waiting” (dai) for employment were first labelled in 2005 as 
“hai dai,” a homonym for “seaweed.” Were glorious “sea turtles” morphing into inglo-
rious “seaweed?” The growth in the “saturation rate of MAs”—the number of returned 
MAs divided by the number of returned MAs + the number of domestic MAs—suggests 
that such a process may be underway. In 2011, the saturation rate of MAs was 27.2 per-
cent; it jumped to 36 percent in 2012, and reached 45 percent by 2017, with 480,900 re-
turned postgraduate students joining 578,045 local graduates in the job market. Even 
if these young people shift away from the United States as a result of an inhospitable 
environment due to politics and COVID-19, their share of reverse migration is likely to 
remain quite high.
The reverse flow of MAs since 2005 has led educators, policy makers, and journalists 
to ask if China was generating a glut of “seaweed” that would fill the ranks of disgrun-
tled wage earners or unemployed at home. Still, in a 2007 paper, Han Donglin (Renmin 
University) and Zweig argued that concerns about “seaweed” were overstated, as 70 
percent of returnees found a job within three months, while 90 percent were employed 
within six months. We also found a large “wage premium,” relative to local graduates. 
 This article draws on several surveys. Three, carried out in 2006 by the ministry of 
education, yielded responses from returnees from Japan, Canada, and Hong Kong. A 
national survey, also in 2006, allowed Zweig to compare local MAs with the aforemen-
tioned returned MAs. A survey in 2016 on a website for single returnees looking for other 
returnees, yielded a further data set. In 2016, Zhaopin, a Chinese headhunter, received 
1,589 usable responses on its website to a questionnaire composed with the Center on 
China and Globalization. Finally, drawing on the 2015 China Household Finance Survey 
conducted by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Du et al. compared 
482 locally trained and 482 returned graduate students by matching pairs with similar 
backgrounds.
Why Did Students Return? “Push,” “Pull,” or Family?
To assess why students returned, Zweig flipped the “push-pull” perspective used to ana-
lyze brain drain to see whether “failing” or being “pushed out” from the West, or being 
“pulled” home by opportunities, affected their return. Zweig also included the option 
of returning for “family,” and then tested these three explanations on seven outcomes, 
including (1) length of job search, (2) level of work satisfaction, (3) life satisfaction after 
returning, (4) a comparison of the benefits and costs of overseas study, (5) estimates 
of the time it would take to recuperate those costs, (6) actual income, and (7) estimat-
ed income.
An interesting paradox was found among respondents to Zhaopin’s 2016 survey. On a 
positive note, using only variables significant at the .05 level, those who were “pulled” 
back took less time to find a job, enjoyed better work and life satisfaction, saw the 
benefits of going abroad as greater than the costs, and earned higher incomes. Those 
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“pushed out” from overseas, and felt compelled to return, faced difficulties only in “re-
couping their costs.” However, those who returned for “family” took more time to find a 
job and recoup the costs of going abroad, and they had negative scores in “work” and 
“life satisfaction.” The message, then, to youth in this strongly family-oriented culture: 
“Don’t go home to satisfy your parents or you will be miserable.” 
The 2016 Zhaopin data also portrays two groups of returnees: Those who “get it” and 
those who “don’t.” The former group succeed because they know the domestic market, 
plan out their careers, and develop a skill that the market needs. But some in the latter 
group go abroad because they cannot enter a good Chinese university, a problem that 
they compound by ignoring the needs of the domestic job market and engaging in poor 
career planning when picking what turns out to be the wrong majors to study abroad. 
These mediocre students who are “pushed back” to China are destined for mediocre 
careers back home, where, despite a lengthened job search, they are still dissatisfied 
with their job choices and easily morph into “seaweed.”
Does Overseas Study Increase Returnees’ Incomes?
Returnees’ salaries in 2006 yielded a significant wage premium. Comparing the income 
of returnees from Japan, Hong Kong, and Canada with 6,000 urban residents from across 
China showed that returned MAs earned 83 percent more than locals with similar aca-
demic degrees.
However, parents’ social class could override the income gains of studying abroad. 
Why say this? The regression model of the 2016 Haigui Zhixin survey found that an over-
seas degree increased a returnee’s income significantly. However, when we introduced 
family income, and whether either parent had been an official, into the model, the im-
pact of studying abroad is no longer statistically significant; instead, family income, and 
whether parents are officials, become significant. Thus, while going abroad could benefit 
many young people, it did not necessarily help the children of the elite.
The survey of 2014 analyzed by Du and his colleagues at SWUFE is even more defini-
tive because of their “matching pair” analysis. The findings, significant at the .05 percent 
level, was that returnees with a graduate degree earn 19.3 percent more than locals with 
the same degree, while there are no income differences between returnees and locals 
with bachelor degrees. They also tested a “human capital” effect, which returnees got 
a higher salary because of their abilities, versus a “signaling effect,” which employers 
paid them higher salaries simply because the returnee had studied abroad. Their find-
ing, that the longer returnees work in a firm the larger the salary gap with locals, sug-
gests that studying abroad pays dividends, in that higher salaries for returnees follow 
only after their employer finds them to be more productive.
As China maintains its transnational ties, foreigners should be comforted with the 
knowledge that the young professional with whom they are interacting—whether in a 
foreign or domestic company, an NGO, a university, or a government office—is likely to 
have had an overseas education. This group of talented individuals, though maligned 
as “seaweed,” are the same people that will allow China to maintain its leading position 
as the preeminent member of the “developing world,” and will, in their own way, con-
tribute to China’s rise and its deeper integration with the global system. 
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China: Graduates Brace for the 
Toughest Job Market
Ying Lu and Yuan Gao
COVID-19 has taken a toll on the global economy and job market, exacerbating chal-lenges faced by job-seekers. In China, the difficulty for university graduates in land-
ing a job has been increasing in recent years, due to such factors as an increase in high-
er education (HE) enrollments and an overall economic slowdown. In 2020, universities 
and colleges in China turned out a record 8.74 million graduates, 400,000 more than in 
2019—leading to even stronger competition among them. This situation has been com-
pounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, reducing the number of jobs offered by small- and 
medium-sized enterprises—the sector hardest hit—to the lowest in decades. To make 
matters worse, international travel restrictions (along with new study abroad and visa 
policies induced by the coronavirus and by political frictions, particularly directed against 
Chinese students), have forced many to abandon their study abroad plans and, instead, 
to seek to enter the job market in this highly challenging environment.
In the face of such grim prospects, a number of initiatives have been ushered in by 
the Chinese government in collaboration with higher education institutions (HEIs) to 
ease employment pressure. These relief policies and measures may be summarized as 
the expansion of HE enrollment; the reinstitution of “second bachelor’s degree” pro-
grams; the development of research assistant positions; and support for entrepreneur-
ship and innovation.
Expansion of Student Enrollment
Widely perceived as an effective measure to ease immediate job market pressure is 
the policy to further expand the scale of enrollment within HE. In early March 2020, the 
ministry of education (MOE) published a new policy document aimed at mitigating the 
impact of COVID-19 on the employment market. According to the document, the scale 
of enrollments at the master’s level are expected to expand by 189,000, an increase of 
23.5 percent over the previous year. The expansion involves some of the leading HEIs, 
with Tsinghua University, for one, enrolling some 6,110 master students in 2020, up 4.8 
percent from 2019. Taking advantage of the added quotas, HEIs in China are not only 
accepting more students, but also ramping up admission processes and adopting non-
traditional selection practices. For instance, graduates whose study abroad plans have 
been interrupted by international travel bans or hostile immigration policies, have been 
given the option to apply for master programs at a number of domestic universities, 
skipping the routinely required entrance examinations.
Reinstitution of “Second Bachelor’s Degree” Programs
With the rapid development of Chinese postgraduate education in recent years, it was 
decided that the “second bachelor’s degree” program (SBD)—first introduced in the 1980s 
to allow students to pursue a second bachelor’s degree after obtaining their first—was 
no longer needed. At the end of May 2020, however, not long after the ministry’s an-
nouncement, in July 2019, of the program’s cancellation, the MOE issued a Notice for 
Higher Education Institutions to Continue Enrolling Students for Second Bachelor’s De-
grees, followed by a long list of over 3,400 accredited SBD programs across some 500 
HEIs. This reactivation of the program in 2020 is interpreted as a sign of the author-
ities’ intention to cushion the graduating class of 2020 from some of the immediate 
job-hunting pressure that they would otherwise face. Not only will students admitted 
to SBD programs have the opportunity to seek a second bachelor degree, they will also 
be afforded a further two-year extension of campus life to prepare for future academic 
and professional pursuits.
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Development of Research Assistant Positions
In June 2020, the ministry of science and technology, the MOE, and four other minis-
tries jointly issued a policy document to encourage institutions implementing research 
projects to create research assistant (RA) positions for HE graduates. The document 
specifies that universities, research institutions, and enterprises undertaking national 
research projects should develop RA positions to offer to HE graduates. The intention 
is that these contract-based positions (often of a temporary nature) will provide those 
seeking employment with an income, while giving them the opportunity to familiar-
ize themselves with China’s research system and prepare for further academic studies. 
It is worth noting that the document specifically states that “the number of positions 
created and the number of graduates employed will count as performance output as 
monitored by the ‘Double World-Class’ Project indicators,” putting pressure on the 137 
“Double World-Class” universities to take direct action. For instance, Beihang Universi-
ty, a leading research university in Beijing, has created 119 RA job openings. Similarly, 
at both Fudan University and Shanghai University, 150 RA positions have been created.
Support for Entrepreneurship and Innovation
These past five years, a series of guidelines on the promotion of “mass entrepreneurship 
and innovation” has been released by the Chinese government, as a means of boosting 
economic growth and creating employment in the modern digital era. Entrepreneurship 
education—an important means of nurturing entrepreneurship—has seen rapid devel-
opment at China’s HEIs. A 2019 Renmin University report on student entrepreneurship 
concludes that entrepreneurship education at Chinese HEIs has a positive impact on 
students’ motivation to set up businesses and the performance of their start-ups. In re-
cent months, the government has reemphasized the importance of “mass entrepreneur-
ship and innovation” and the role of universities in various initiatives. However, as an 
entrepreneurship ecosystem is yet to be properly developed and confidence has been 
shaken by business closures across parts of the country, it is hard to predict the number 
of post-COVID job-seekers who will be able to take on such challenges.
These initiatives—some of which may only delay problems or have a temporary im-
pact—are initial efforts to address what is shaping up to be the “coldest winter” for job 
hunting. While universities may contribute to providing temporary solutions, the cur-
rent challenges serve as a serious reminder for universities in China and beyond of the 
need to rethink ways of effectively preparing their graduates for a post-COVID world and 
helping them better connect with the new job market. 
For-Profit Higher Education 
in Latin America: Exception or 
Precursor?
Dante J. Salto and Daniel C. Levy
A major new form of higher education—legal for-profit higher education—burst heav-ily onto the Latin American scene a quarter-century ago, yet remains largely unno-
ticed in most of the region, let alone beyond. Concentrated in just three countries, it is 
so weighty in two of them that Latin America leads all other regions in total for-profit 
enrollment, even as for-profit higher education grows in most regions. Will for-profit 
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higher education continue more as an exception in the Latin America region, or is it a 
precursor of a trend? To begin pondering such a consequential question, we must first 
gain a sense of the regional private higher education (PHE) context, and why and how 
exceptions have emerged and fared.
A Strong Private Club, but Nonprofit Only?
Like the bulk of the world outside the United States, Latin America has had a mostly 
public higher education monopoly and public-dominant national systems since inde-
pendence in the early nineteenth century. By the mid-twentieth century, however, Lat-
in America had become the first region with PHE in nearly all countries. Today, with one 
out of two students in PHE, Latin America is easily the leading region in terms of the 
private share of total enrollment.
Whereas Latin America has had ample opportunity to accustom itself to the idea of 
PHE, the legal for-profit sector has burst in as a controversial new creature, even a com-
petitor to both the private nonprofit and public sectors, generating considerable divi-
siveness. Even private nonprofits themselves, long regarded with scorn by their pub-
lic peers as lower-tier institutions of dubious legitimacy, mistrust the new cousins and 
question their purposes. Nonprofits often join their public counterparts in denying the 
compatibility of profit and educational values.
Much confusion about legal for-profit boundaries derives from sloppily inconsistent 
definitions. It is surplus distribution to shareholders that legally defines profit-making 
institutions, whereas nonprofits ostensibly must reinvest all gains back into the insti-
tution. Misunderstandings arise largely from nonprofits taking advantage of the legal 
definition’s tight bounds to benefit financially. Although discussions about “for-profits” 
often include anything from nonprofit sector revenue generation to nonprofits owned 
by international corporations (e.g., Laureate’s large Mexican presence), those realities 
do not strictly define what constitutes de jure for-profits. Confusion also arises from 
nonprofits taking advantage of monitoring and enforcement difficulties to make and 
distribute profit illegally.
The For-Profit Leap to the Global Zenith
However much one could legitimately doubt the nature of much of its nonprofit PHE, 
Latin America has remained true to its European roots by preventing legal for-profit PHE 
well into the 1980s. This is despite having very much uprooted the tradition of public 
near-monopoly by having over 30 percent of total enrollment being private. Except for 
a Chilean niche in the 1980s, legal for-profit remained absent into the 1990s. Yet today, 
even as for-profit grows rapidly in most other regions, Latin America stands first in raw 
for-profit enrollment. This is especially striking considering that Asia’s total private en-
rollment is three times that of Latin America. Equally startling is that still only five Lat-
in American countries have for-profit enrollment, fewer than in Africa, the Arab region, 
Asia, or even Europe. Moreover, Latin America’s for-profit PHE is concentrated above all 
in Brazil, followed by Peru and then Chile, while Costa Rica and Bolivia round out the 
list. Asia’s for-profit enrollment is also concentrated in two large private sectors (in In-
donesia and the Philippines) having major for-profit components. But neither of these 
approaches Brazil’s in magnitude, and other Asian for-profit PHE does not make up the 
difference. Asia’s three largest private sectors outside Indonesia—India, Japan, and South 
Korea—proscribe for-profit PHE. In this way, Asia’s for-profit share of PHE (and of total 
higher education) is small compared to Latin America’s.
Brazil is by far the Latin American and worldwide for-profit giant as it enrolls 3.3 mil-
lion out of its 8 million students within the private for-profit higher education sector. 
Peruvian for-profits probably enroll more than 700,000 students. In both countries, the 
private for-profit sector enrolls more students than their private nonprofit or public 
counterparts. Nor is Chile’s enrollment in for-profit postsecondary centers insignificant, 
though recent legislation may well cut a significant chunk from the estimated 343,000 
students enrolled in that sector. Costa Rica adds about 40,000 students. Thus, for-prof-
its in just these four countries (Bolivia is omitted for not providing official data or esti-
mates) enroll about 4.4 million students, representing 32 percent and 17 percent of Latin 
America’s private and total higher education enrollment, respectively. 
Much confusion about legal 
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The key to for-profit legalization in both Brazil and Peru was presidential conviction 
that for-profits in disguise were fraudulent for the citizenry, their illegitimate nonprof-
it exemptions depriving government of tax revenues. Government thus forced extant 
and future private institutions to choose: real nonprofit or de jure for-profit. Quickly, 
those choosing for-profit status found market success in focusing on unmet access de-
sires. These have facilitated the further massification of their systems, usually as low-
tier, nonelite, demand-absorbing institutions. Prestige is concentrated in public institu-
tions along with bold, nonprofit private exceptions, though some for-profits find useful 
job-market niches.
Here to Stay?
Though the future of Latin America’s for-profit PHE is of course unknown, we have some 
basis for informed speculation. The Chilean case illustrates swaying uncertainty. Latin 
America’s modern regional for-profit breakthrough came to Chile, before Brazil or Peru. 
Yet Chile’s permission, forced under the military dictatorship in the 1980s, was restricted 
to postsecondary training centers, mostly specialized in technical and vocational are-
nas. Legalization of for-profit never reached the university level and, with recent stu-
dent protests and populist legislative changes, even some training centers are switch-
ing to nonprofit status.
Indicators from beyond Chile are also mixed. The huge recent spurt in Brazil and Peru 
suggests Latin America’s foundational countries are not retreating from their for-profit 
path. Other cash-strapped governments may seek to follow suit in gaining tax revenues 
by peeling away nonprofit disguises. Meanwhile, the rapid for-profit growth in other re-
gions could help legitimize the form, or at least provide further cover under which to 
meet growing demand without digging into COVID-impaired public budgets. Concentrat-
ed still in so few countries, Latin America’s vast private sectors and continued overall 
higher education expansion might hold significant room for for-profit expansion in its 
other 18 countries. On the other hand, some countries might prefer to keep for-profits 
in disguise to avoid intensified open controversy. This is all the more likely as left-lean-
ing populism spreads and student activism regains the visibility of yesteryear. The 2011 
Colombia reversal of a proposed pro-for-profit project, like the Chilean student pro-
tests against profit, may counterbalance the forces pressing in favor of spreading legal 
for-profit PHE beyond its few present strongholds. 
Privatization and Unequal Access 
in India
Vishal Jamkar and Christopher Johnstone
India is the second largest higher education system in the world, with about 800 uni-versities and nearly 40,000 colleges attended by 35 million students. It took India 
more than 55 years to move from an elite model of higher education to a mass model, 
and this growth shows no sign of slowing down. As an example, India’s gross enrollment 
rate (GER) grew from 1.5 percent in 1961 to 5.9 percent in 1991, and further to 27 percent in 
2017. As India’s higher education continues to massify, several key features are emerging 
in the sector: greater diversity in the course offering, especially by engineering colleges 
and polytechnic institutes, which have begun to offer more applied science courses; the 
emergence of private universities and colleges to meet increasing demand; and growth 
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in access of students from traditionally marginalized or minoritized groups in India, such 
as those labeled Scheduled Caste (SC) (also known as Dalit, formerly “Untouchables”), 
Scheduled Tribes (ST), Other Backward Class (OBC), as well as from Muslim communities, 
a religious minority in India. Despite increases in access, however, higher education en-
rollment is still dominated by higher caste and class students from the Hindu majority.
Privatization and Inclusion
In contemporary Indian higher education, two main narratives and approaches have 
emerged over the past few decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, higher education was in-
clusive in terms of socioeconomic representation. Both public and government-aided 
private universities offered affordable tuition fees, providing hostels, scholarships, fee 
exemptions, books, and reserved seats for a targeted number of SC, ST, and OBC stu-
dents, as well as for women.
However, since the early 1980s, the Indian government’s support of pro-poor poli-
cies such as academic and hostel fee waivers and scholarships has dwindled, and gov-
ernment support to public universities and aided private institutes has stagnated. Both 
central and state governments have enacted policies giving financial autonomy to pri-
vate institutions to mobilize resources without government underwriting, also allow-
ing policy autonomy. Privatization continued to increase in the 2000s. At that time, the 
Indian judiciary also played a pivotal role in allowing private institutions to raise their 
own funds and eliminating institutional reservation quotas aimed to increase enroll-
ment of SC, ST, and OBC students.
While public support for marginalized and minoritized communities has weakened 
over the past several decades, privatization has simultaneously increased overall en-
rollment. Data from the National Sample Survey indicates that from 1995 to 2014, the 
share of postsecondary students in private unaided institutes increased by more than 
four times, from 7.1 percent to 32.7 percent, while enrollment in public institutions de-
creased significantly, from 57.5 to 41.4 percent. According to the All India Survey of Higher 
Education (AISHE), there were more than 35,000 colleges in 2015, out of which more than 
22,000 were private unaided, 5,000 received private aid, and nearly 8,000 were govern-
ment funded. At present, nearly 78 percent of colleges are private, and these colleges 
enroll 67 percent of Indian students.
Privatization and Equity
The massification of India’s higher education has been carried forward primarily through 
the proliferation of unaided private institutions. During this period, SC, ST, and OBC stu-
dents have been jeopardized in two instances. First, the supreme court ruling that these 
institutions need not abide by reservation quotas has led to an equity dilemma as the 
higher education sector continues to grow: India’s affirmative action policies meant to 
redress historic injustices now only apply to a minority of institutions. Second, gradu-
al shifts in scholarship, fee waiver, hostel fee waiver, and loan policies has limited the 
choices of lower-income students, reducing their opportunities for affordable private 
education.
Massification and privatization appear to have brought about an increase in enrollment 
among all groups, but mostly among those of higher castes. Private, unaided universi-
ties located in tier-1 and tier-2 cities in India are increasingly making education available 
largely to urban and rich students and are not required to make it affordable to students 
from poorer backgrounds, nor to abide by affirmative action policies. Further, under the 
auspices of the human resource development ministry, premier public institutes such as 
the Indian Institute of Management have been allowed to do away with reservations for 
PhD programs by leveraging meritocracy and “quality of education” arguments. In these 
same institutions, faculty demographics reinforce stratifications of access and mobility. 
According to the AISHE report of 2017–2018 released by the ministry, for example, 56.8 
percent of teaching staff were from the “general” (majority) category, 8.6 percent were 
labeled SC (compared to 15 percent of the general population), and only 2.27 percent of 
faculty positions are held by those labeled ST (compared to 7.5 percent of the general 
population). These disparities may have a reproductive effect on admissions into insti-
tutions and may impact on how equity is envisioned in academic programs.
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Conclusions
The massification and privatization of universities and colleges in India has in general 
led to a wider range of options within higher education. Over the past several decades, 
the gross enrollment ratio has increased for a variety of groups, yet enrollment dispar-
ities still exist. Massification has increased choices, but in an unregulated way. Relaxa-
tion of fee caps, removal of government support grants for housing and fees, and a lack 
of affirmative action protection in private universities mean that enrollment disparities 
may grow. The location and the fee structure of private universities and colleges have 
disproportionately increased opportunities for rich and higher caste students. The elim-
ination of mandatory reservations in private universities has also reduced the flow of 
students from historically marginalized groups and Muslims students. As private higher 
education strengthens its hold in India, policy makers and private institutions need to 
identify diversity as a target for social responsibility and social good. Failure to do so 
will reinforce the social stratification that has existed in India for millennia. 
Poland: A Decade of Reforms 
(2010–2020)
Marek Kwiek
During the first two decades following 1989, Polish universities remained largely un-reformed. Core features of the system during that period—such as noncompetitive 
research funding modes, strongly collegial and ineffective governance, and a complicat-
ed multilevel system of academic degrees and positions—remained virtually untouched 
until the early 2010s.
Research was underfunded, and the research mission undervalued. System expan-
sion and teaching-related privatization (serving huge numbers of fee-paying part-time 
students) were the main policy directions. However, starting in the mid-2000s, the long-
term implications of declining demographics became clear to policy makers and insti-
tutional leaders. Indeed, while in 2006, there were about 2 million students, by 2020, 
their number had fallen to 1.2 million. Consequently, by the late 2000s, research became 
a new national policy focus.
A Decade of Reforms
The 2010s were a decade of reforms that changed almost every aspect of university 
functioning. Research was reinstitutionalized as a main university mission and a new 
grant-based research-funding system was introduced. Poland moved from privatiza-
tion to deprivatization and from deinstitutionalization to reinstitutionalization of the 
research mission in its universities.
With research back as a national policy focus, research grants became competitive-
ly distributed by a new national research council (the NCN, established in 2010). Public 
subsidies for research became linked to faculty performance and national assessment. 
Internationalization of research became a keyword in all major policy documents of 
the decade.
New funding and assessment mechanisms fueled vertical stratification in the sys-
tem and the gradual emergence of two types of institutions: those that were strong-
ly research oriented, and those with limited research output and funding. Additional-
ly, the new Excellence Initiative—Research Universities (the IDUB national program for 
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2020–2026) started in 2020, with the aim to provide additional funding to 10 large uni-
versities selected on a competitive basis. IDUB’s total funding is about USD 1 billion for 
seven years, and its spending is discretionary, based on special institutional develop-
ment plans and linked to revised institutional strategies. 
However, the system of incentives to internationalize Polish research has so far proved 
to be ineffective. The new, highly competitive way of distributing research funds did 
not result in positive changes in the structure of Polish scientific output, as had been 
expected. The share of output published as a result of international collaboration has 
been one of the lowest in Europe, even though the number of internationally indexed 
publications has grown substantially. Poland was not able to make full use of European 
Union research funds, especially those from the European Research Council. Low ex-
penditures on academic research have contributed to the failure of internationalization 
policies: A radical change in the management of research funds (the new grant system) 
was not accompanied by a radical change in the level of financing of academic science. 
In addition, the system of academic promotion and the principles of research assess-
ment exercises (termed “parameterization”) in 2014 and 2017 did not promote research 
internationalization strongly enough.
First Wave of Reforms
There were two waves of reforms in the 2010s. The first wave was carried out between 
2009 and 2011 by minister Barbara Kudrycka (the Kudrycka reforms) and the second be-
tween 2016 and 2018 by minister Jarosław Gowin (the Gowin reforms). Within the frame-
work of the Kudrycka reforms, the Polish system was reconfigured on the basis of mul-
tilevel governance, with new intermediary coordinating institutions situated between 
higher education institutions and the state, the NCN being a good example. Financing 
of academic research became more directly linked to the assessment of measurable re-
search productivity, targeting about 1,000 basic academic units, mostly faculties.
Prior to the Kudrycka reforms, the state was directly involved in coordinating higher 
education. In the new governance architecture, higher formal autonomy of institutions 
and academics became combined with higher levels of accountability. The new inter-
mediary agencies are, in principle, independent of the state in that they are either di-
rectly managed by academics elected by the academic community at large, or indirectly 
influenced by academics through governing boards. The state continues to define global 
levels of public funding, priority areas of national research, and the primary division of 
funds between main funding agencies. However, decisions on how to allocate research 
funds are taken by academics within these agencies.
Second Wave of Reforms
The fundamental ideas behind the Gowin reforms (carried out in 2016–2018, but with de-
layed implementation until 2022) were meant to differentiate the higher education system 
further and internationalize Polish academic knowledge production. The two main con-
cepts discussed were system differentiation (teaching-oriented versus research-oriented 
institutions) and research internationalization (national versus international research).
While teaching was important in the Gowin reforms, the main focus was on the dif-
ferentiation of the system along teaching and research lines, and on the internationali-
zation of research. The main recent changes to the higher education system focused on 
research: new institutional structures in universities, formed along a newly defined list 
of research disciplines; a new research evaluation system (expected to start in 2022); a 
selection of 10 research-intensive universities receiving additional funding in the frame-
work of the IDUB Excellence program; and new doctoral schools established in univer-
sities with a visible research output, rather than scattering doctoral education across 
the whole system. Another important change was the strengthening of rectors and their 
management teams—at the expense of traditional representative bodies such as the 
senate and faculty councils. 
This research internationalization agenda meant introducing heavily quantitative, 
research-focused indicators to the funding and assessment systems: What was expect-
ed was more international collaboration, more internationally visible (through global 
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datasets) research, and more internationally coauthored publications, at the individual, 
institutional, and national levels.
Universities and Big Politics
In the 2010s, universities were not politicized and were kept protected from big national 
political shifts throughout the two waves of reforms. In particular, the change of pow-
er in 2015 from centrist to rightist political parties did not lead to any change of higher 
education policies. University reforms and universities themselves have been spared 
the devastating political clashes, with strong populist overtones, of the past few years. 
No politically motivated changes were introduced; however, in the past few months, the 
theme of “renationalization” of higher education, especially in the social sciences and 
humanities, as opposed to its ongoing “internationalization,” has been discussed in po-
litical circles. It is hard to predict to what extent national politics may change the gener-
al higher education policy directions of internationalization of research, vertical strat-
ification in the system, and competitive funding modes in the future. However, looking 
at the experience from the periods from 2009 to 2015 (centrist governments) and from 
2015 to 2020 (rightist governments), prospects to continue reforms at the systemic level 
seem relatively good, despite some turbulence on the surface. Hopefully, the reforms 
will be strengthened and consolidated rather than stopped or reversed, and universi-
ties will not be pushed in new, possibly populist, directions. 
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CIHE PUBLICATIONS
The Center for International Higher Education (CIHE)  has now published Volume 49 in 
its book series, Global Perspectives on Higher Education: Balbachevsky, E., Cai, Y., Eggins 
H. and Shenderova S. (2021). Building Higher Education Cooperation with the EU, Chal-
lenges and Opportunities from four Continents. Brill/Sense, Leiden/Boston. 
A full list of CIHE-affiliated publications is available on the CIHE website.
CIHE UPDATES
CIHE welcomes the opportunity to connect with readers of International Higher Educa-
tion in a number of ways:
Professional Development Courses
Registration is now open for our online CIHE Summer Professional Development Series. 
This year’s offerings include:
 ]   Making Quality Work in Higher Education (June 3–6, 2021; asynchronous)—Taught 
 by Gerardo Blanco, Academic Director, CIHE, Boston College.
 ]  Inclusive Practices in Education Abroad (June 14–25, 2021; synchronous meetings 
 on Tuesdays and Thursdays, 12:00–1:15 pm EDT)—Taught by Nick Gozik, Dean  
 of Glob al Education, Elon University.
 ]   Internationalizing the Curriculum for All Students (June 28–July 2, 2021; asynchro- 
 nous)—Taught by Betty Leask, Professor Emerita, La Trobe University.
WES–CIHE Summer Institute
The annual WES–CIHE Summer Institute will be held on June 9–11, 2021, in a fully virtu-
al format. All graduate students and early-career professionals are invited to submit a 
proposal on the theme of “Innovative and Inclusive Internationalization in Higher Edu-
cation.” Proposals must be received by May 1, 2021.
CIHE Conference
Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, CIHE has made the difficult decision to post-
pone our first biennial Conference on International Higher Education for another year. 
We now hope to be able to welcome friends and colleagues to Boston College on Octo-
ber 20–22, 2022. Further information about the conference, including information about 
how to submit a proposal, will be available in early 2022.
IHE’s growing audience
From now on, IHE is also available 
to lecturers of the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service (DAAD). 
Around 500 lecturers, who sup-
port universities in over 110 
countries in the field of German 
studies and German as a foreign 
language, will be provided with 
IHE’s comments and analyses on 
trends and issues of importance 
to higher education systems, 
institutions, and stakeholders 
around the world. For more in-
formation on the program, please 
visit the DAAD website.
Are you a graduate student or early 
career professional? Join us at the Virtual 
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 ] Andrés Bernasconi, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Chile
 ] Eva Egron-Polak, Former Secretary General, International 
Association of Universities, France
 ] Ellen Hazelkorn, BH Consulting Associates, Ireland
 ] Jane Knight, University of Toronto, Canada
 ] Marcelo Knobel, University of Campinas, Brazil
 ] Betty Leask, La Trobe University, Australia
 ] Nian Cai Liu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
 ] Laura E. Rumbley, European Association for International 
Education, the Netherlands
 ] Jamil Salmi, Global Tertiary Expert, Colombia
 ] Damtew Teferra, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
 ] Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Tohoku University, Japan
 ] Maria Yudkevich, National Research University Higher School 
of Economics, Russia
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